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1. Introduction 
 
Nowadays in modern industries, the scale and complexity of process systems are increased 
continuously. These systems are subject to low productivity, system faults or even hazards 
because of various conditions such as mis-operation, equipment quality change, external 
disturbance, and control system failure. In these systems, many elements are interacted, so a 
local fault can be propagated and probably spread to a wide range. Thus it is of great 
importance to find the possible root causes and consequences according to the current 
symptom promptly. Compared with the classic fault detection for local systems, the fault 
detection for large-scale complex systems concerns more about the fault propagation in the 
overall systems. And this demand is much close to hazard analysis for the system risks, 
which is a kind of qualitative analysis in most cases prior to quantitative analysis.  
The signed directed graph (SDG) model is a kind of qualitative graphical models to describe 
the process variables and their cause-effect relations in continuous systems, denoting the 
process variables as nodes while causal relations as directed arcs. The signs of nodes and arc 
correspond to variable deviations and causal directions individually. The SDG obtained by 
flowsheets, empirical knowledge and mathematical models is an expression of deep 
knowledge. Based on the graph search, fault propagation paths can be obtained and thus 
certainly be helpful for the analysis of root causes and sequences (Yang & Xiao, 2005a). And 
with development of the computer-aided technology, graph theory has been implemented 
successfully by some graph editors, some of which, like Graphviz (2009), can transform text 
description into graphs easily. Hence the SDG technology can be easily combined with the 
other design, analysis and management tools. 
The SDG definition and its application in fault diagnosis were firstly presented by Iri et al. 
(1979). Ever since then, many scholars have contributed to this area, including modeling, 
inference, software development and applications. Many efforts have been particularly 
made to implement the methods and to overcome the disadvantages, such as spurious 
solutions. Here we recognize some representatives among them. Kramer & Palowitch (1987) 
3
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used rules to describe SDG arcs, which shows that expert systems can be employed as a tool 
in this problem. Oyeleye & Kramer (1988) took into account the qualitative simulation for 
the SDG inference. Shiozaki et al. (1989) improved the SDG model by adding fault revealing 
time. Yu et al. (Chang & Yu, 1990; Yu & Lee, 1991) introduced fuzzy information for arc 
signs to describe the steady state gains. Maurya et al. (2003a, 2003b, 2006) described the 
modeling method based on differential equations (DEs) and algebraic equations (AEs), 
analyzed the initial and final responses based on SDGs, and studied the description and 
analysis of control loops. SDG method has been combined with other data-driven methods 
to improve the diagnosis accuracy (Vedam & Venkatasubramanian, 1999; Lee et al., 2006). 
At first, the inference is based on single fault assumption, but multiple fault cases attract 
more and more attention (Vedam & Venkatasubramanian, 1997; Zhang et al. 2005; Chen & 
Chang, 2007). Up to now, SDG method has been implemented in some software tools 
(Mylaraswamy & Venkatasubramanian, 1997; McCoy et al. 1999; Zhang et al., 2005) and 
applied in various industrial systems.  
Aiming at SDG applications in the area of fault detection and hazard analysis, the problems 
of description and inference are most important. As the system extends, the time 
consumption of graph search is heavy, so the single-level SDG model should be transformed 
into hierarchical model to improve the search efficiency. The root cause can be searched in 
this model level by level according to the initial response of the system. In control systems 
and many other cases, cycles exist in the graph, resulting in the truncation or misleading to 
the search. Thus the theoretic fundamentals and dynamic features of SDGs should be 
studied. We have analyzed the fault propagation principles by operations of corresponding 
qualitative matrices and obtained some typical rules of control systems. 
Moreover, fault detection is performed based on sensor readings, thus the sensor location 
strategy affects the performance of fault detection. Due to the economical or technical 
limitations, the number of sensors should be limited while meeting the demands of fault 
detection. This can be considered in the SDG framework. We analyze main criteria such as 
detectability, identifiability and reliability in the framework of SDGs and presented 
algorithms, in order to guarantee that the faults can be detected and identified, and to 
optimize the fault detection ability.  
This chapter is organized as follows: first, the SDG description is reviewed and hierarchical 
model is indicated; then the fault propagation rules and inference approaches are 
summarized to lead to the successful application of fault detection and hazard analysis; 
some considerations about sensor location are introduced next; finally a generator set 
process in a power plant is modeled and analyzed to illustrate the proposed model and 
method. 
 
2. Model Description of Signed Directed Graph 
 
2.1 Basic Form of SDG Model 
SDGs are established by representing the process variables as graph nodes and representing 
causal relations as directed arcs. An arc from node A to node B implies that the deviation of 
A may cause the deviation of B. For convenience, “+”, “-” or “0” is assigned to the nodes in 
comparison with normal operating value thresholds to denote higher than, lower than or 
within the normal region respectively. Positive or negative influence between nodes is 
distinguished by the sign “+” (promotion) or “-” (suppression), assigned to the arc (Iri et al., 
1979). The definition is as follows: 
Definition 1: An SDG model    is the composite ( , )G   of (1) a digraph G  which is the 
quadruple ( , , , )N A     of (a) a set of nodes 1 2{ , , , }nN v v v  , (b) a set of arcs 
1 2{ , , , }mA a a a  , (c) a couple of incidence relations : A N   and : A N   which make each arc correspond to its initial node  ka  and its terminal node  ka , respectively; and (2) a function : { , }A    , where ( ) ( )k ka a A   is called the sign of arc ka . Usually we use aij to denote the arc from vi to vj. 
Definition 2: A pattern on the SDG model ( , )G   is a function :  { ,0, }N    . ( )v  
( )v N  is called the sign of node v , i.e. 
( ) 0v   for v v vx x    
( )v     for v v vx x    
( )v     for v v vx x    
where vx  is the measurement of the variable v , vx  is the normal value, and v  is the 
threshold. 
Definition 3: Given a pattern   on a SDG model ( , )G  , an arc a  is said to be consistent 
(with  ) if ( ) ( ) ( )a a a       . A path, which is consisted of arcs 1 2, , , ka a a  linked 
successively, is said to be consistent (with  )  if 1 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( )k ka a a a        . 
 
2.2 Modeling Methods of SDGs 
 
2.2.1 SDG modeling by mathematical equations 
In general, SDGs can be obtained either from operational data and process knowledge, or 
mathematical models. If we have the differential algebraic equations (DAEs), then we can 
derive the structure and signs of the graph by specific methods (Maurya, 2003a).  
A typical dynamic system can be expressed as a set of DEs 
 
 1d , ,d i i n
x f x xt    (1) 
 
where 1, , nx x  are state variables. By Taylor expansion near normal state, we get 
 
   
0 01
0 0 0
1
1 , ,
d , ,d
n
n
i i
i n j j
j j x x
x ff x x x xt x
     (2) 
 
where 0 01 , , nx x  are normal states. Eq. (2) can be written as the following matrix form 
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The Jacobian matrix 
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can be described by an SDG whose signs of arcs are defined as 
 
 
0 01 , ,
sgn sgn
n
i
j i
j x x
fx x x
      
 (5) 
 
if the nodes correspond to the state variables. Thus the SDG actually describes the direct 
influences or sensitivities between state variables. 
In practical problems, the systems often have the following form as DEs:  
 
     2 22 1 0d d d d d dn nna x t a x t a x t a x e      (6) 
 
where x is the state and e is the disturbance. When 1n  , it is a first-order system:  
 
     0 1 1d d 1t x a a x a e    (7) 
 
The step response is shown as Fig. 1(a). An arc is constructed from the node e to x with a 
sign sgn[1/a1] and a self-cycle on the node x with a sign -sgn[a0/a1]. For high-order systems, 
simplification can be made because the corresponding DE includes different order 
derivatives of the same variable, which can be avoided for the explicit physical meaning of 
the model. They can be approximated as first-order systems with delays:  
 
     0 1 1d d ( ) ' ' ( ) 1 ' ( )t x t a a x t a e t     (8) 
 
where   is the equivalent pure delay. Its step response is shown as Fig. 1(b). The method of 
constructing SDGs is the same as the former one, and the delay can be embodied in dynamic 
SDGs (Yang & Xiao, 2006a).  
 
Fig. 1. Step response of different systems. (a) First-order system, (b) High-order system 
 
Algebraic equations are usually included in the mathematical models as constraints which 
can also be transformed into SDGs (Maurya et al., 2003a) although they are noncausal in 
nature. Because there may be multiple perfect matchings between equations and variables, 
the corresponding SDGs may not be unique. Some treatment should be made to screen the 
unsteady or spurious SDGs (Oyeleye & Kramer, 1988; Maurya et al., 2003a). 
For example, a tank system is shown as Fig. 2(a) where L is the level in the tank, R is 
resistance in the outlet pipe (can be manipulated by a valve), F1 and F2 are inlet and outlet 
flowrates respectively. The system is described as following DAEs: 
 
2F LR
  (9) 
1 2
d
dA L F Ft    (10) 
 
where A is the cross sectional area of the tank, and   is a constant. By the above method, 
the SDG is set up as Fig. 2(b). 
 
 (a)                                                                      (b) 
Fig. 2. Tank system and its SDG. (a) Schematic, (b) SDG 
 
2.2.2 SDG modeling by qualitative process knowledge 
In more cases, the SDG is established by qualitative process knowledge and experience. Fig. 
3(a) shows a tank with one inlet and two outlets with control. The arcs from F2 to V2 and L to 
V3 in Fig. 3(b) describe the flowrate control and level control respectively. Each control loop 
can be expressed by a negative cycle in SDG because of the negative feedback action. This 
qualitative SDG can be obtained directly from process knowledge and does need the exact 
mathematical equations. Sometimes the qualitative simulation and sensitivity experiments 
may also help. The SDGs obtained by this method often include indirect causalities besides 
direct ones, so the graph should be simplified and transformed so that all the arcs stand for 
direct causalities. Some rules are summarized by Yang & Xiao (2005b).  
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  (a)                                                                            (b) 
Fig. 3. Schematic and SDG of tank system with controlled flowrates. (a) Schematic, (b) SDG 
 
Besides, P&ID diagrams and other flowsheets are very important topological process 
knowledge expression that can be standardized in XML (extensible markup language) 
format. It has been implemented in some commercial software products such as SmartPlant 
P&ID from Intergraph. The topology or connectivity obtained here includes both material 
flow and information flow, which are needed for SDG modeling. Although the granularity 
is entity-based, which is not enough for the variable-based SDG modeling, this kind of 
topological information is the fundamental of SDG and can be used as references as well 
(Thambirajah et al., 2009).  
The SDG set up by the above methods can be validated by process data. For example, 
correlation is a necessary condition of causality, so the cross-correlation between every two 
measured variables can be used to validate the arcs in SDGs, and the directions can also be 
obtained by shifting the time series to find the maximal cross-correlation. Alternatively, 
probabilistic measure such as transfer entropy can be used to obtain the causality and 
directionality (Bauer et al., 2007).  
In summary, the main steps of SDG modeling are: (1) Collect process knowledge, especially 
P&ID diagram and equations. (2) Set up the material flow diagraph by connectivity 
information between entities. (3) Choose the key variables and give them signs according to 
the process knowledge. (4) Add control arcs on the diagraph to constitute the SDG skeleton. 
(5) Add other variables and arcs to form the entire SDG. (6) Simplify and verify the SDG by 
graph theory. (7) Validate the SDG with process data and sensitivity experiments. 
 
2.3 Hierarchical SDG Description of Large-Scale Complex Systems 
Based on the decomposition-aggregation approach, a single-level SDG model can be 
transformed into a hierarchical model (Gentil & Montmain, 2004; Preisig, 2009). With this 
model, it is clear and easy to understand the system inherently. As such, the fault analysis 
method should also be modified from a centralized one to a distributed one. 
The whole SDG model can be classified into 3 levels. If the scale of the whole system is too 
large, then more levels can be established, but 3-level model is enough for most cases. So we 
take it as a typical pyramid structure. The top level is called system level, where the system 
is divided into several sub-systems. Sometimes a large-scale system may include several 
independent sub-systems which can be dealt with separately. Also, in many cases, several 
components are operated in sequence or in parallel, with no recycle or other kind of 
interactions existed across the different components, then these components can also be 
regarded as sub-systems. Of course, if the SDG of the whole system is connected and cannot 
be separated, then it composes the only sub-system itself.  
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In the middle level, each control system is regarded as a super-node and the relations 
between control systems are expressed by arcs among controlled variables and a few 
important manipulated variables or other variables. The signs of arcs are determined 
according to the propagation rules to assure the consistency of the paths. The variables in 
some control loop and not appeared in other part of the system are usually invisible here. 
The SDG in this level is the backbone of the system which shows the main connectivity in 
the system flowsheet.  
The bottom-level SDGs are the SDG units of all the control systems. The description is the 
most detailed qualitative expression because it shows the causalities between variables. 
Since most of the control systems are based on feedback actions, each SDG in this level 
usually contains at least a loop with various bias nodes attached on them.  
 
2.4 Matrix Explanation of SDG Model 
In this section, we look at the SDG model from another viewpoint. An SDG can be also 
described as an adjacency matrix X with the element 1/0 denoting the direct adjacency and 
direction between two variables. Actually it is the transpose of Jaccobian matrix in Eq. (4) 
with unsigned elements. By matrix computations, reachability matrix R can be obtained 
from X, which shows the directed reachability from one variable to another, in which the 
element 1 means there are at least a path in the corresponding SDG (Jiang et al., 2008). It can 
be observed that the computation is just another form of graph traversal.  
By simultaneous permutation of row and column (with variable order changed), X can be 
block triangulated as follows: 
 
11 12 1
22 20'
0 0
m
mT
mm
        


   

A A A
A AX TXT
A
 (11) 
 
Each block in the diagonal denotes a sub-system with a partial order meaning that the sub-
system with larger number can not reach the one with smaller number. It can also be 
explained by the reachability matrix which is definitely also block triangulated with the 
same order as: 
 
 
11 12 1
# 22 22 0
0 0
m
mn
mm
           

    

B B B
B BR X' X' X'
B
 (12) 
 
where the sign # is the Boolean equivalent (Mah, 1989). If the intersection block Bij is a zero 
matrix, then the corresponding two sub-systems are independent (no arcs between them), 
otherwise they are in sequence. Thus we explain the decomposition between the top and 
middle level. 
When we look at the relationship among control systems, we take a control loop as a super-
node and add an arc from node i to node j, if the controller output of controller i can directly 
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  (a)                                                                            (b) 
Fig. 3. Schematic and SDG of tank system with controlled flowrates. (a) Schematic, (b) SDG 
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flow and information flow, which are needed for SDG modeling. Although the granularity 
is entity-based, which is not enough for the variable-based SDG modeling, this kind of 
topological information is the fundamental of SDG and can be used as references as well 
(Thambirajah et al., 2009).  
The SDG set up by the above methods can be validated by process data. For example, 
correlation is a necessary condition of causality, so the cross-correlation between every two 
measured variables can be used to validate the arcs in SDGs, and the directions can also be 
obtained by shifting the time series to find the maximal cross-correlation. Alternatively, 
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directionality (Bauer et al., 2007).  
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P&ID diagram and equations. (2) Set up the material flow diagraph by connectivity 
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2.3 Hierarchical SDG Description of Large-Scale Complex Systems 
Based on the decomposition-aggregation approach, a single-level SDG model can be 
transformed into a hierarchical model (Gentil & Montmain, 2004; Preisig, 2009). With this 
model, it is clear and easy to understand the system inherently. As such, the fault analysis 
method should also be modified from a centralized one to a distributed one. 
The whole SDG model can be classified into 3 levels. If the scale of the whole system is too 
large, then more levels can be established, but 3-level model is enough for most cases. So we 
take it as a typical pyramid structure. The top level is called system level, where the system 
is divided into several sub-systems. Sometimes a large-scale system may include several 
independent sub-systems which can be dealt with separately. Also, in many cases, several 
components are operated in sequence or in parallel, with no recycle or other kind of 
interactions existed across the different components, then these components can also be 
regarded as sub-systems. Of course, if the SDG of the whole system is connected and cannot 
be separated, then it composes the only sub-system itself.  
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In the middle level, each control system is regarded as a super-node and the relations 
between control systems are expressed by arcs among controlled variables and a few 
important manipulated variables or other variables. The signs of arcs are determined 
according to the propagation rules to assure the consistency of the paths. The variables in 
some control loop and not appeared in other part of the system are usually invisible here. 
The SDG in this level is the backbone of the system which shows the main connectivity in 
the system flowsheet.  
The bottom-level SDGs are the SDG units of all the control systems. The description is the 
most detailed qualitative expression because it shows the causalities between variables. 
Since most of the control systems are based on feedback actions, each SDG in this level 
usually contains at least a loop with various bias nodes attached on them.  
 
2.4 Matrix Explanation of SDG Model 
In this section, we look at the SDG model from another viewpoint. An SDG can be also 
described as an adjacency matrix X with the element 1/0 denoting the direct adjacency and 
direction between two variables. Actually it is the transpose of Jaccobian matrix in Eq. (4) 
with unsigned elements. By matrix computations, reachability matrix R can be obtained 
from X, which shows the directed reachability from one variable to another, in which the 
element 1 means there are at least a path in the corresponding SDG (Jiang et al., 2008). It can 
be observed that the computation is just another form of graph traversal.  
By simultaneous permutation of row and column (with variable order changed), X can be 
block triangulated as follows: 
 
11 12 1
22 20'
0 0
m
mT
mm
        


   

A A A
A AX TXT
A
 (11) 
 
Each block in the diagonal denotes a sub-system with a partial order meaning that the sub-
system with larger number can not reach the one with smaller number. It can also be 
explained by the reachability matrix which is definitely also block triangulated with the 
same order as: 
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where the sign # is the Boolean equivalent (Mah, 1989). If the intersection block Bij is a zero 
matrix, then the corresponding two sub-systems are independent (no arcs between them), 
otherwise they are in sequence. Thus we explain the decomposition between the top and 
middle level. 
When we look at the relationship among control systems, we take a control loop as a super-
node and add an arc from node i to node j, if the controller output of controller i can directly 
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affect the controlled variable of controller j without going through controller output of any 
other nodes. This SDG as a part of the middle-level SDG is also named as control loop 
diagraph (Jiang, 2008). 
For a feedback control system, there exists a loop in the corresponding SDG. Thus according 
to the controllability concept, all the variables within the loop are strongly connected, which 
can be found in the reachability matrix as a block with all the elements are ones. 
Let us look at the tank example as Fig. 3 and get the adjacency matrix and reachability 
matrix by Eq. (12) as follows, both of which are block triangulated. 
 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 1 0 0
            
X , 
0 1 0 0 1 1 1
0 0 0 0 1 1 1
0 0 1 1 1 1 1
0 0 1 1 1 1 1
0 0 0 0 1 1 1
0 0 0 0 1 1 1
0 0 0 0 1 1 1
            
R  (13) 
 
where the variable order is V1, F1, V2, F2, V3, F3, L. They are divided into 3 groups: inlet (V1 
and F1), one outlet with flowrate control (V2 and F2) and another outlet with level control 
(V3, F3 and L). The elements of R22 and R33 are all ones because they are control loops, and 
the elements of R23 are ones showing the flowrate controller influences the level controller. 
Hence the control loop diagraph is consisted of two nodes corresponding to the two 
controllers and an arc corresponding to the influence between them. Moreover, if the 
variable order is changed to put V1 and V2 meaning the two controller outputs at the last, 
the corresponding block is just the adjacency matrix of the control loop diagraph. This is a 
useful property that links the concepts of SDG, control loop digraph and the matrices. 
Matrix explanation helps us understand the SDG concept and its potential in applications. In 
fact, some results, such as propagation rules, are derived from matrix description. 
 
3. Inference Approaches Based on SDGs 
 
3.1 Fault Propagation Rules 
Based on the SDG description, the fault propagation can be described qualitatively. There 
are two basic principles: 
Proposition 1: The fault is propagated along the consistent paths. 
Proposition 2: The node signs are determined by nodal balance, i.e. the sign on each node 
must be equal to the net influence on the node: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )j ij i
i
v a v     (14) 
 
where the qualitative operation rules are as Table 1. Due to the loss of quantitative 
information, some signs can not be determined shown as ‘?’ in the table, which causes the 
uncertainty in the solutions. 
 
No. sgn[x] sgn[y] sgn[x]+sgn[y] sgn[x]·sgn[y] 
1 0 sgn[y] sgn[y] 0 
2 ± sgn[x] sgn[x] + 
3 ± -sgn[x] ? - 
Table 1. Qualitative operation rules 
 
The logic on a node in SDGs is OR in nature because any input deviation can result in the 
node sign. In some cases, however, there are other types of logics, for example, the logic is 
AND, XOR or high/low-selective, or arcs or nodes are conditional, some necessary logic 
nodes should be added to the SDG (Yang & Xiao, 2007). 
Proposition 1 can be easily understood. By testing the consistency one can find the fault 
propagation paths based on the measurements, which form a sub-graph of the original SDG, 
called cause-effect graph (Iri et al., 1979). On the other hand, one can predict the next step 
response based on the measured and assumed variables. 
Proposition 2, however, may have some limitations because it is only suitable for the 
dynamic trends near the initial state. When a fault occurs, the response of variables can be 
divided into three stages – initial, intermediate, and final responses. In large-scale complex 
systems, the intermediate response is very complex, but in most cases, we concentrate only 
on the initial and final stages. For stable systems with fixed input, the final response is a 
steady state. Thus the input and exogenous disturbances are assumed as step functions to 
show abrupt changes.  
Initial response is the first response just after the exogenous input changes. In dynamic 
systems expressed by DAEs, initial response is the nonzero response of system variables 
predicted by propagation through all the shortest paths in the corresponding SDG if we 
define the length of arcs in AE and DE portion by 0 and 1 respectively (Maurya, 2003a). Final 
response is the steady states of variables obtained after the dynamic period ends. It can be 
solved simply by setting the derivatives as zeros in DE portion of DAE. For the obtained 
AEs, the final response can be predicted by propagation through all the directed (acyclic) 
paths in the corresponding SDG. However, there may exist more than one perfect matching 
between equations and variables, thus there may exist more than one SDG corresponding to 
the AEs. If there is only one perfect matching, the above method is correct; otherwise, the 
result may be wrong because the results based on different perfect matchings are 
inconsistent. There is an exception, however, if an SDG corresponding to a perfect matching 
contains only negative cycles, then any perfect matching (for which the SDG contains only 
negative cycles) can be chosen and the final response can be decided using the above 
method (Maurya, 2003a). 
 
3.2 Control Action Influences on Fault Propagation 
 
3.2.1 SDG description and fault propagation analysis of single control loop 
Control actions should be considered particularly because they are forced actions that are 
different from process property itself and they may cause the truncation or misleading of 
fault propagation. We discuss this problem using the general methods and obtain some 
special results (Maurya, 2003b, 2006). 
In the bottom level, SDG models are established for all kinds of control systems among
which the most common and basic one is single PID loop shown as Fig. 4. The deviation e of 
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affect the controlled variable of controller j without going through controller output of any 
other nodes. This SDG as a part of the middle-level SDG is also named as control loop 
diagraph (Jiang, 2008). 
For a feedback control system, there exists a loop in the corresponding SDG. Thus according 
to the controllability concept, all the variables within the loop are strongly connected, which 
can be found in the reachability matrix as a block with all the elements are ones. 
Let us look at the tank example as Fig. 3 and get the adjacency matrix and reachability 
matrix by Eq. (12) as follows, both of which are block triangulated. 
 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 1 0 0
            
X , 
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0 0 1 1 1 1 1
0 0 1 1 1 1 1
0 0 0 0 1 1 1
0 0 0 0 1 1 1
0 0 0 0 1 1 1
            
R  (13) 
 
where the variable order is V1, F1, V2, F2, V3, F3, L. They are divided into 3 groups: inlet (V1 
and F1), one outlet with flowrate control (V2 and F2) and another outlet with level control 
(V3, F3 and L). The elements of R22 and R33 are all ones because they are control loops, and 
the elements of R23 are ones showing the flowrate controller influences the level controller. 
Hence the control loop diagraph is consisted of two nodes corresponding to the two 
controllers and an arc corresponding to the influence between them. Moreover, if the 
variable order is changed to put V1 and V2 meaning the two controller outputs at the last, 
the corresponding block is just the adjacency matrix of the control loop diagraph. This is a 
useful property that links the concepts of SDG, control loop digraph and the matrices. 
Matrix explanation helps us understand the SDG concept and its potential in applications. In 
fact, some results, such as propagation rules, are derived from matrix description. 
 
3. Inference Approaches Based on SDGs 
 
3.1 Fault Propagation Rules 
Based on the SDG description, the fault propagation can be described qualitatively. There 
are two basic principles: 
Proposition 1: The fault is propagated along the consistent paths. 
Proposition 2: The node signs are determined by nodal balance, i.e. the sign on each node 
must be equal to the net influence on the node: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )j ij i
i
v a v     (14) 
 
where the qualitative operation rules are as Table 1. Due to the loss of quantitative 
information, some signs can not be determined shown as ‘?’ in the table, which causes the 
uncertainty in the solutions. 
 
No. sgn[x] sgn[y] sgn[x]+sgn[y] sgn[x]·sgn[y] 
1 0 sgn[y] sgn[y] 0 
2 ± sgn[x] sgn[x] + 
3 ± -sgn[x] ? - 
Table 1. Qualitative operation rules 
 
The logic on a node in SDGs is OR in nature because any input deviation can result in the 
node sign. In some cases, however, there are other types of logics, for example, the logic is 
AND, XOR or high/low-selective, or arcs or nodes are conditional, some necessary logic 
nodes should be added to the SDG (Yang & Xiao, 2007). 
Proposition 1 can be easily understood. By testing the consistency one can find the fault 
propagation paths based on the measurements, which form a sub-graph of the original SDG, 
called cause-effect graph (Iri et al., 1979). On the other hand, one can predict the next step 
response based on the measured and assumed variables. 
Proposition 2, however, may have some limitations because it is only suitable for the 
dynamic trends near the initial state. When a fault occurs, the response of variables can be 
divided into three stages – initial, intermediate, and final responses. In large-scale complex 
systems, the intermediate response is very complex, but in most cases, we concentrate only 
on the initial and final stages. For stable systems with fixed input, the final response is a 
steady state. Thus the input and exogenous disturbances are assumed as step functions to 
show abrupt changes.  
Initial response is the first response just after the exogenous input changes. In dynamic 
systems expressed by DAEs, initial response is the nonzero response of system variables 
predicted by propagation through all the shortest paths in the corresponding SDG if we 
define the length of arcs in AE and DE portion by 0 and 1 respectively (Maurya, 2003a). Final 
response is the steady states of variables obtained after the dynamic period ends. It can be 
solved simply by setting the derivatives as zeros in DE portion of DAE. For the obtained 
AEs, the final response can be predicted by propagation through all the directed (acyclic) 
paths in the corresponding SDG. However, there may exist more than one perfect matching 
between equations and variables, thus there may exist more than one SDG corresponding to 
the AEs. If there is only one perfect matching, the above method is correct; otherwise, the 
result may be wrong because the results based on different perfect matchings are 
inconsistent. There is an exception, however, if an SDG corresponding to a perfect matching 
contains only negative cycles, then any perfect matching (for which the SDG contains only 
negative cycles) can be chosen and the final response can be decided using the above 
method (Maurya, 2003a). 
 
3.2 Control Action Influences on Fault Propagation 
 
3.2.1 SDG description and fault propagation analysis of single control loop 
Control actions should be considered particularly because they are forced actions that are 
different from process property itself and they may cause the truncation or misleading of 
fault propagation. We discuss this problem using the general methods and obtain some 
special results (Maurya, 2003b, 2006). 
In the bottom level, SDG models are established for all kinds of control systems among
which the most common and basic one is single PID loop shown as Fig. 4. The deviation e of 
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the set point r and the measurement xm of the controlled variable x, is inputted into the 
controller whose output u goes to the actuator and thus effects the controlled plant through 
the manipulated variable q. Hence they compose a closed loop. Because the controlled 
variable may be affected by some disturbances or be coupled with other system variables, 
the exogenous plant and variable xj are also added. Assume that controlled plant and the 
controller are both linear amplifiers, i.e. proportion elements, with the positive gain k and kv 
respectively. The control law of PID controller is: 
 
 
 
P I D
P c
I c I
D c D
d d
d d
u u u u
u k e
t u k e
u k e t


      
 (15) 
 
where, kP is the positive proportion parameter, I  and D  are integral and differential time 
constant respectively. 
 
Fig. 4. Block diagram of a feedback control loop 
 
According to the control law, the DAEs of the system are as follows: 
 
m mbx x x   (16) 
me r x   (17) 
P cu k e  (18) 
  I c Id dt u k e   (19) 
D c D d du k e t   (20) 
P I D bu u u u u     (21) 
v bq k u q   (22) 
j jx kq a x   (23) 
 
where subscript ‘b’ denotes bias. There are two perfect matchings between the equations 
and variables in AE portion, shown as Table 2, whose corresponding SDGs are shown as 
Fig. 5, in which the nodes with shadow are deviation nodes, arrows with solid and dotted 
lines denote signs “+” and “-” respectively. It is noted that the node d de t  is an individual 
Controller Actuator Controlled Plant 
Sensor
+
+
+
+
+
+
xr e
xm
u
ub qb
q
xmb
+
+
ExogenousPlant xj
kc kv k
+
–
node with special function, although it is the derivative of e. In applications, we generally 
assume that all changes on nodes are step functions, because the SDGs are only used to 
analyze the qualitative trends. Hence d de t  can be also replaced by e , but its effect is 
limited in initial response. Here the effect of d de t  on Du  is the same as the effect of e  on 
Pu , but with shorter duration. 
 
Equations Matched variables in perfect matching No. 1 
Matched variables in 
perfect matching No. 2 
(16) xm x
(17) e xm
(18) uP e
(20) uD uD
(21) u uP
(22) q u
(23) x q
Table 2. Perfect matchings between the AEs and variables 
 
        
(a)                                                                              (b) 
Fig. 5. Two SDGs of the PID control loop. (a) Case 1 (corrected), (b) Case 2 (spurious) 
 
Eq. (23) describes the controlled plant, thus the arc direction should be from q to x according 
to the physical meaning, which shows the cause-effect relationship, so the case of Fig. 5(b) is 
removed. Moreover, if the plant shows some dynamic characteristic, for example, the left-
hand of the equation is d dx t , then the equation becomes a DE, hence there is only one 
perfect matching, and the case of Fig. 5(b) does not exist any more. Using Fig. 5(a), the initial 
response can be analyzed, for example, if the set point r increases, e, uP, u, q, x and xm will 
become “+” immediately, and uI will become “+” gradually because the arc from e to uI is a 
DE arc. This propagation path r→e→uP→u→q→x→xm is consistent with the actual 
information transfer relations. Thus when we only consider the initial response of the 
system, the SDG of this control loop is obtained by transforming the blocks and links in 
block diagram into nodes and arcs while keeping the direction. However, in this example, 
no matter whether the case of Fig. 5(b) is reasonable, the analysis results of initial response 
by the two SDGs are the same because there are no positive cycles within them. We 
summarize the following rule: 
x
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the set point r and the measurement xm of the controlled variable x, is inputted into the 
controller whose output u goes to the actuator and thus effects the controlled plant through 
the manipulated variable q. Hence they compose a closed loop. Because the controlled 
variable may be affected by some disturbances or be coupled with other system variables, 
the exogenous plant and variable xj are also added. Assume that controlled plant and the 
controller are both linear amplifiers, i.e. proportion elements, with the positive gain k and kv 
respectively. The control law of PID controller is: 
 
 
 
P I D
P c
I c I
D c D
d d
d d
u u u u
u k e
t u k e
u k e t


      
 (15) 
 
where, kP is the positive proportion parameter, I  and D  are integral and differential time 
constant respectively. 
 
Fig. 4. Block diagram of a feedback control loop 
 
According to the control law, the DAEs of the system are as follows: 
 
m mbx x x   (16) 
me r x   (17) 
P cu k e  (18) 
  I c Id dt u k e   (19) 
D c D d du k e t   (20) 
P I D bu u u u u     (21) 
v bq k u q   (22) 
j jx kq a x   (23) 
 
where subscript ‘b’ denotes bias. There are two perfect matchings between the equations 
and variables in AE portion, shown as Table 2, whose corresponding SDGs are shown as 
Fig. 5, in which the nodes with shadow are deviation nodes, arrows with solid and dotted 
lines denote signs “+” and “-” respectively. It is noted that the node d de t  is an individual 
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node with special function, although it is the derivative of e. In applications, we generally 
assume that all changes on nodes are step functions, because the SDGs are only used to 
analyze the qualitative trends. Hence d de t  can be also replaced by e , but its effect is 
limited in initial response. Here the effect of d de t  on Du  is the same as the effect of e  on 
Pu , but with shorter duration. 
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Table 2. Perfect matchings between the AEs and variables 
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Fig. 5. Two SDGs of the PID control loop. (a) Case 1 (corrected), (b) Case 2 (spurious) 
 
Eq. (23) describes the controlled plant, thus the arc direction should be from q to x according 
to the physical meaning, which shows the cause-effect relationship, so the case of Fig. 5(b) is 
removed. Moreover, if the plant shows some dynamic characteristic, for example, the left-
hand of the equation is d dx t , then the equation becomes a DE, hence there is only one 
perfect matching, and the case of Fig. 5(b) does not exist any more. Using Fig. 5(a), the initial 
response can be analyzed, for example, if the set point r increases, e, uP, u, q, x and xm will 
become “+” immediately, and uI will become “+” gradually because the arc from e to uI is a 
DE arc. This propagation path r→e→uP→u→q→x→xm is consistent with the actual 
information transfer relations. Thus when we only consider the initial response of the 
system, the SDG of this control loop is obtained by transforming the blocks and links in 
block diagram into nodes and arcs while keeping the direction. However, in this example, 
no matter whether the case of Fig. 5(b) is reasonable, the analysis results of initial response 
by the two SDGs are the same because there are no positive cycles within them. We 
summarize the following rule: 
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Rule 1: The fault propagation path of the initial response in a control loop is the longest 
acyclic path starting from the fault origin in the path “set point → error → manipulated 
variable → controlled variable → measurement value → error”, which is consistent with the 
information flow in the block diagram. 
Final response is easier. The left-hand side of Eq. (19) is zero, so 0e   in the steady state, 
which can be obtained from the concept. Hence uP and uD are both zeros. The above DAEs 
can be transformed into: 
 
m mbx x x   (24) 
mx r  (25) 
I bu u u   (26) 
v bq k u q   (27) 
j jx kq a x   (28) 
 
Now the perfect matching is exclusive and the corresponding SDG is shown as Fig. 6 that is 
the simplification of Fig. 5(b). There are two fault propagation paths: r→xm→x→q and 
xj→q→u→uI. If the set point r increases, then xm, x, q, u and uI will all increase in the steady 
state as long as the control action is effective. However, if only xmb increases, then xm will 
not be affected, but x will increase, that is the action of the control loop. We find that the Fig. 
5(b) also makes sense for it reflects the information transfer relation in steady state. From the 
viewpoint of physical meaning, when control loop operates, the controlled variable is 
determined by the set point, and the controller looks like an amplifier with infinite gain, 
whose input equals to zero and whose output is determined by the demands. This logical 
transfer relation is opposite to the actual information relation. 
Fig. 6. Steady-state SDG of a PID control loop 
 
Because the D action is only effective in the initial period, the fault propagation path of PI 
control is the same as the above one. Because of I action, some variables show compensatory 
response, for example, the response of xm due to xmb is limited in the initial stage. If there is 
only P action, then e is not zero in the steady state, thus uI and related arcs in Fig. 5(a) are 
deleted, and both the initial response and steady-state response can be analyzed with this 
graph. 
The rule of fault propagation analysis in steady state can be summarized as follows: 
x
xmu
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Rule 2: The fault propagation path of the steady-state response in a control loop is the path 
“set point → measurement value → controlled variable → manipulated variable” and 
“exogenous variable → manipulated variable”. 
When control loop operates, the above analysis shows the fault propagation principles due 
to the output deviation of sensor, controller, actuator and other exogenous variables. When 
control loop does not operate, there are two cases: (1) structural faults, e.g. the failure of 
sensor, controller or actuator causes the break of some arcs and the control loop becomes 
open, (2) excessive deviation causes the controller saturation, leading to the I action cannot 
eliminate the residual and let 0e  , which is similar with the P action case. 
 
3.2.2 SDG description and fault propagation analysis of various control systems 
Based on the above analysis of PID control loop, other control loops can be modeled as 
SDGs by the extension, combination, or transformation of the above SDG. Fault nodes are 
added according to the actual demands. Based on these models, fault propagation can also 
be shown explicitly. 
Feedforward control is a supplement of feedback control. It is very familiar in actual cases, 
but it is easy to be treated according to the foregoing methods because it composes paths but 
not cycles, not leading to multiple perfect matchings.  
Split-range control means the different control strategies are adopted in different value 
intervals. Here the sign of the arcs or even the graph structure may change with the variable 
values, which is realized by several controllers in parallel connection. This case is very hard 
for SDG to deal with. We have to do some judgments as making inference, and modify the 
structure or use conditional arcs to cover all the cases (Shiozaki et al., 1989). 
Cascade control can be regarded as the extension of single loop case. It can be solved 
directly by AEs, or by the combination of two single loops. For example, the cascade control 
system in Fig. 7 has the steady-state SDG as shown in Fig. 8, where the controlled variable of 
the outer loop u1 is the set point of the inner loop r2. 
Fig. 7. Block diagram of a cascade control system 
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Rule 1: The fault propagation path of the initial response in a control loop is the longest 
acyclic path starting from the fault origin in the path “set point → error → manipulated 
variable → controlled variable → measurement value → error”, which is consistent with the 
information flow in the block diagram. 
Final response is easier. The left-hand side of Eq. (19) is zero, so 0e   in the steady state, 
which can be obtained from the concept. Hence uP and uD are both zeros. The above DAEs 
can be transformed into: 
 
m mbx x x   (24) 
mx r  (25) 
I bu u u   (26) 
v bq k u q   (27) 
j jx kq a x   (28) 
 
Now the perfect matching is exclusive and the corresponding SDG is shown as Fig. 6 that is 
the simplification of Fig. 5(b). There are two fault propagation paths: r→xm→x→q and 
xj→q→u→uI. If the set point r increases, then xm, x, q, u and uI will all increase in the steady 
state as long as the control action is effective. However, if only xmb increases, then xm will 
not be affected, but x will increase, that is the action of the control loop. We find that the Fig. 
5(b) also makes sense for it reflects the information transfer relation in steady state. From the 
viewpoint of physical meaning, when control loop operates, the controlled variable is 
determined by the set point, and the controller looks like an amplifier with infinite gain, 
whose input equals to zero and whose output is determined by the demands. This logical 
transfer relation is opposite to the actual information relation. 
Fig. 6. Steady-state SDG of a PID control loop 
 
Because the D action is only effective in the initial period, the fault propagation path of PI 
control is the same as the above one. Because of I action, some variables show compensatory 
response, for example, the response of xm due to xmb is limited in the initial stage. If there is 
only P action, then e is not zero in the steady state, thus uI and related arcs in Fig. 5(a) are 
deleted, and both the initial response and steady-state response can be analyzed with this 
graph. 
The rule of fault propagation analysis in steady state can be summarized as follows: 
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Rule 2: The fault propagation path of the steady-state response in a control loop is the path 
“set point → measurement value → controlled variable → manipulated variable” and 
“exogenous variable → manipulated variable”. 
When control loop operates, the above analysis shows the fault propagation principles due 
to the output deviation of sensor, controller, actuator and other exogenous variables. When 
control loop does not operate, there are two cases: (1) structural faults, e.g. the failure of 
sensor, controller or actuator causes the break of some arcs and the control loop becomes 
open, (2) excessive deviation causes the controller saturation, leading to the I action cannot 
eliminate the residual and let 0e  , which is similar with the P action case. 
 
3.2.2 SDG description and fault propagation analysis of various control systems 
Based on the above analysis of PID control loop, other control loops can be modeled as 
SDGs by the extension, combination, or transformation of the above SDG. Fault nodes are 
added according to the actual demands. Based on these models, fault propagation can also 
be shown explicitly. 
Feedforward control is a supplement of feedback control. It is very familiar in actual cases, 
but it is easy to be treated according to the foregoing methods because it composes paths but 
not cycles, not leading to multiple perfect matchings.  
Split-range control means the different control strategies are adopted in different value 
intervals. Here the sign of the arcs or even the graph structure may change with the variable 
values, which is realized by several controllers in parallel connection. This case is very hard 
for SDG to deal with. We have to do some judgments as making inference, and modify the 
structure or use conditional arcs to cover all the cases (Shiozaki et al., 1989). 
Cascade control can be regarded as the extension of single loop case. It can be solved 
directly by AEs, or by the combination of two single loops. For example, the cascade control 
system in Fig. 7 has the steady-state SDG as shown in Fig. 8, where the controlled variable of 
the outer loop u1 is the set point of the inner loop r2. 
Fig. 7. Block diagram of a cascade control system 
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Fig. 8. Steady-state SDG of a cascade control system 
 
Similar control methods are ratio control, averaging control, etc. Fig. 9 is a dual-element 
averaging control system whose objective is to balance two variables – level and flow, the 
block diagram of which is shown as Fig. 10. Px=PL –PF +PS +c, where Px is the pressure signal 
of the adder output, PL is the level measurement signal, PF is the flow measurement signal, 
PS is a tunable signal of the adder. In the simplest case, flow process and its measurement 
are both positive linear elements, and the level process is a negative linear element, so the 
steady-state SDG is shown as Fig. 11. Although there are several perfect matchings, SDG has 
only a negative cycle, thus we can analyze the fault propagation principle through the 
directed paths. 
Fig. 9. A dual-element averaging control system 
 
Thus we conclude: 
Rule 3: The fault propagation path in a control system in steady state can be combined from 
the ones of single-loop by combining the same nodes and adding arcs by transforming AEs. 
In an industrial system, control systems play a special but important role. They compose 
information flow cycles in initial response but result in different flow in steady state 
response. Fig. 12 shows a system with a control loop. According to the above rules, the bias 
in x1 propagates along the forward path (blue) in initial response while against the feedback 
path in steady state response. 
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Fig. 10. Block diagram of a dual-element averaging control system 
 
Fig. 11. Steady-state SDG of a dual-element averaging control system 
 
The bias in x2 propagates along two paths until x3 and x4 in initial response, while PV and 
x4 restore to normal in the steady state because the steady state SDG changes the structure 
and directionality of the graph and thus PV becomes a compensatory variable. 
 
Fig. 13. Control system’s effect on fault propagation in a system. (a) Bias in x1, (b) Bias in x2 
 
3.2.3 Example 
In a boiler system, the three-element control of the boiler water level is widely used, in 
which the main controlled variable is water level. If we take steam flow and inlet flow into 
account, the control system is a feedforward-cascade system, as shown in Fig. 13. In the 
initial stage of the disturbance, the SDG is shown as Fig. 14(a), which can be derived by 
original DAEs. Certainly the initial fault influence follows this SDG. The control action, 
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Fig. 8. Steady-state SDG of a cascade control system 
 
Similar control methods are ratio control, averaging control, etc. Fig. 9 is a dual-element 
averaging control system whose objective is to balance two variables – level and flow, the 
block diagram of which is shown as Fig. 10. Px=PL –PF +PS +c, where Px is the pressure signal 
of the adder output, PL is the level measurement signal, PF is the flow measurement signal, 
PS is a tunable signal of the adder. In the simplest case, flow process and its measurement 
are both positive linear elements, and the level process is a negative linear element, so the 
steady-state SDG is shown as Fig. 11. Although there are several perfect matchings, SDG has 
only a negative cycle, thus we can analyze the fault propagation principle through the 
directed paths. 
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Rule 3: The fault propagation path in a control system in steady state can be combined from 
the ones of single-loop by combining the same nodes and adding arcs by transforming AEs. 
In an industrial system, control systems play a special but important role. They compose 
information flow cycles in initial response but result in different flow in steady state 
response. Fig. 12 shows a system with a control loop. According to the above rules, the bias 
in x1 propagates along the forward path (blue) in initial response while against the feedback 
path in steady state response. 
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The bias in x2 propagates along two paths until x3 and x4 in initial response, while PV and 
x4 restore to normal in the steady state because the steady state SDG changes the structure 
and directionality of the graph and thus PV becomes a compensatory variable. 
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In a boiler system, the three-element control of the boiler water level is widely used, in 
which the main controlled variable is water level. If we take steam flow and inlet flow into 
account, the control system is a feedforward-cascade system, as shown in Fig. 13. In the 
initial stage of the disturbance, the SDG is shown as Fig. 14(a), which can be derived by 
original DAEs. Certainly the initial fault influence follows this SDG. The control action, 
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however, is enrolled and some deviations are restored to the normal region after a complex 
intermediate process. If the control action is successful, the fault may be blocked in the 
control loop and does not spread any more. But for some kinds of faults, the situation is 
different, because the control action makes the fault propagation path change. According to 
the method in the foregoing sections, we can construct the backbone (ignoring the bias 
nodes) of the steady-state SDG model as Fig. 14(b) which is quite different from Fig. 14(a). 
Similar with Fig. 9, other fault nodes can be added to Fig. 14(b) and thus we can find the 
steady-state fault propagation paths. 
 
Fig. 13. Three-element control system 
 
(a)                                                                    (b) 
Fig. 14. SDGs of the three-element control system. (a) Initial response, (b) Steady state 
 
3.3 Inference Approaches 
In safety area, fault diagnosis and hazard assessment, especially hazard and operability 
analysis (HAZOP) are two different tasks. The former is to correctly find and identify the 
fault origin that is the cause leading to the symptom when fault occurs. It is based on 
measurements and is real-timed. While the latter, hazard assessment is to an off-line 
analysis whose purpose is to find the possible hazards due to all various causes. For this 
reason, we assume a series of departure nodes as fault origins, then analyze the possible 
consequences that are all the triggered departure nodes. Both fault diagnosis and hazard 
assessment need the interior mechanism of the system to express how the faults propagate. 
Thus the SDG model can be employed.  
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3.3.1 Graph traversal approach 
The most common algorithm for searching the fault origin is depth-first traversal on the 
graph (Iri et al., 1979), which is a kind of efficient fault inference for both the single and 
multiple fault origin cases (Zhang et al., 2005). Its theoretical basis is nodal balance in Eq. 
(14). A depth-first traversal algorithm constructs a path by moving each time to an adjacent 
node until no further arcs can be found that have not yet been visited, the implementation of 
which is a recursive procedure. 
For HAZOP purpose, forward traversal is applied from the assumed origin to predict all the 
variables based on consistency, which is deductive reasoning (Venkatasubramanian et al., 
2000; Yang & Xiao, 2006b). For the fault detection purpose, backward traversal is applied 
within the causal-effect graph to find the maximal strongly connected component (Iri et al., 
1979), which is abductive reasoning. Actually, the whole procedure includes two steps: 
Step 1: Trace the possible fault origins back along the arcs. 
Step 2: Make forward inference from these nodes to screen the candidates to choose which 
one is the real or most probable fault origin. 
The time complexity of a traversal search is O(n2) in which n denotes the node number in the 
graph. When the system scale increases, the time for a traversal is too long to meet the 
demands of fault detection. Thus the model structure should be transformed from a single-
level one to a hierarchical one. By this way, the search is first performed in the higher level 
to restrict the fault origin in a sub-system. Then the search is performed in the sub-graph of 
this sub-system. 
For the hierarchical model, hierarchical inference from top to bottom is obtained naturally. 
The graph traversal is performed firstly in the higher level finding the possible super-node 
that includes the fault origin. Next perform the graph traversal in the lower level to restrict 
the possible location of the root cause. Assume the sub-system contains m control systems, 
and each control system contains k variables, then the time complexity of a traversal in a 
single-level model is O(m2k2), and the time complexity in a 2-level model is 
O(m2+k2)<<O(m2k2). Thus the fault analysis in a hierarchical model has much higher 
efficiency.  
Here the number of fault origin is assumed to be only one, that is, the reason that leads to 
the fault is only one (Iri et al., 1979). This is reasonable because multiple faults seldom 
appear at the same time (Shiozaki et al., 1985). For multiple fault origin cases, minimal cut 
sets diagnosis algorithm was presented (Vedam & Venkatasubramanian, 1997), where all 
possible combinations of overall bottom events should be input into the computer to explore 
and those which make the top events appear are the cut sets. This algorithm has the distinct 
disadvantage of low efficiency because of exponential explosion. 
 
3.3.2 Other improved approaches 
In order to utilize the system information more sufficiently, Han et al. (1994) used fuzzy set 
to improve the existing models and methods, but their method is not so convenient for on-
line inference and is not applicable for dynamical systems. Some scholars introduced 
temporal evolution information such as transfer-delay (Takeda et al., 1995; Yang & Xiao, 
2006a) and other kind of information into SDG for dynamic description. Probability is also 
proposed to model the system, which uses conditional probabilities of fault events to 
describe causes and effects among variables (Yang & Xiao, 2006c). Hence the inference is 
respect to the fault probability. 
www.intechopen.com
Qualitative Fault Detection and Hazard Analysis Based on  
Signed Directed Graphs for Large-Scale Complex Systems 31
however, is enrolled and some deviations are restored to the normal region after a complex 
intermediate process. If the control action is successful, the fault may be blocked in the 
control loop and does not spread any more. But for some kinds of faults, the situation is 
different, because the control action makes the fault propagation path change. According to 
the method in the foregoing sections, we can construct the backbone (ignoring the bias 
nodes) of the steady-state SDG model as Fig. 14(b) which is quite different from Fig. 14(a). 
Similar with Fig. 9, other fault nodes can be added to Fig. 14(b) and thus we can find the 
steady-state fault propagation paths. 
 
Fig. 13. Three-element control system 
 
(a)                                                                    (b) 
Fig. 14. SDGs of the three-element control system. (a) Initial response, (b) Steady state 
 
3.3 Inference Approaches 
In safety area, fault diagnosis and hazard assessment, especially hazard and operability 
analysis (HAZOP) are two different tasks. The former is to correctly find and identify the 
fault origin that is the cause leading to the symptom when fault occurs. It is based on 
measurements and is real-timed. While the latter, hazard assessment is to an off-line 
analysis whose purpose is to find the possible hazards due to all various causes. For this 
reason, we assume a series of departure nodes as fault origins, then analyze the possible 
consequences that are all the triggered departure nodes. Both fault diagnosis and hazard 
assessment need the interior mechanism of the system to express how the faults propagate. 
Thus the SDG model can be employed.  
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3.3.1 Graph traversal approach 
The most common algorithm for searching the fault origin is depth-first traversal on the 
graph (Iri et al., 1979), which is a kind of efficient fault inference for both the single and 
multiple fault origin cases (Zhang et al., 2005). Its theoretical basis is nodal balance in Eq. 
(14). A depth-first traversal algorithm constructs a path by moving each time to an adjacent 
node until no further arcs can be found that have not yet been visited, the implementation of 
which is a recursive procedure. 
For HAZOP purpose, forward traversal is applied from the assumed origin to predict all the 
variables based on consistency, which is deductive reasoning (Venkatasubramanian et al., 
2000; Yang & Xiao, 2006b). For the fault detection purpose, backward traversal is applied 
within the causal-effect graph to find the maximal strongly connected component (Iri et al., 
1979), which is abductive reasoning. Actually, the whole procedure includes two steps: 
Step 1: Trace the possible fault origins back along the arcs. 
Step 2: Make forward inference from these nodes to screen the candidates to choose which 
one is the real or most probable fault origin. 
The time complexity of a traversal search is O(n2) in which n denotes the node number in the 
graph. When the system scale increases, the time for a traversal is too long to meet the 
demands of fault detection. Thus the model structure should be transformed from a single-
level one to a hierarchical one. By this way, the search is first performed in the higher level 
to restrict the fault origin in a sub-system. Then the search is performed in the sub-graph of 
this sub-system. 
For the hierarchical model, hierarchical inference from top to bottom is obtained naturally. 
The graph traversal is performed firstly in the higher level finding the possible super-node 
that includes the fault origin. Next perform the graph traversal in the lower level to restrict 
the possible location of the root cause. Assume the sub-system contains m control systems, 
and each control system contains k variables, then the time complexity of a traversal in a 
single-level model is O(m2k2), and the time complexity in a 2-level model is 
O(m2+k2)<<O(m2k2). Thus the fault analysis in a hierarchical model has much higher 
efficiency.  
Here the number of fault origin is assumed to be only one, that is, the reason that leads to 
the fault is only one (Iri et al., 1979). This is reasonable because multiple faults seldom 
appear at the same time (Shiozaki et al., 1985). For multiple fault origin cases, minimal cut 
sets diagnosis algorithm was presented (Vedam & Venkatasubramanian, 1997), where all 
possible combinations of overall bottom events should be input into the computer to explore 
and those which make the top events appear are the cut sets. This algorithm has the distinct 
disadvantage of low efficiency because of exponential explosion. 
 
3.3.2 Other improved approaches 
In order to utilize the system information more sufficiently, Han et al. (1994) used fuzzy set 
to improve the existing models and methods, but their method is not so convenient for on-
line inference and is not applicable for dynamical systems. Some scholars introduced 
temporal evolution information such as transfer-delay (Takeda et al., 1995; Yang & Xiao, 
2006a) and other kind of information into SDG for dynamic description. Probability is also 
proposed to model the system, which uses conditional probabilities of fault events to 
describe causes and effects among variables (Yang & Xiao, 2006c). Hence the inference is 
respect to the fault probability. 
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We can use Bayesian inference on the graph to calculate the probabilities; it is a direct 
method. Suppose that the node set of the probabilistic SDG is V E F H   , in which E  is 
the subset of evidence nodes whose value or probabilities are known, F  is the subset of 
query nodes whose probabilities are to be computed, and H  is the subset of hidden nodes 
which is not cared about in the inference. The inference process of is to compute the 
conditional probability of Fx  given the known Ex . 
 
    
,| E FF E
E
p x xp x x p x  (29) 
 
where 
 
   , , ,
H
E F E F H
x
p x x p x x x  (30) 
   ,
F
E E F
x
p x p x x  (31) 
 
To solve this problem, Bayesian formula and its chain rule should be used adequately, and 
also the junction tree algorithm can be used for multiple fault origin cases. This method 
could be used where there are distinct random phenomenon, both for fault detection and 
HAZOP (Yang & Xiao, 2006b), but the cycles in SDGs should be handled. The algorithm is 
the combination of depth-first search and junction tree algorithm, written as pseudo code: 
 
  
On the other hand, rule-based inference (Kramer & Palowitch, 1987) is applicable when 
expert system is available. This method can be used to improve the inference accuracy with 
the appropriate rule description and operation. Rough set theory provides an idea of 
handling vague information and can be used to data reduction, thus it can be introduced to 
the fault isolation problem (a kind of decision problems) to optimize the decision rules. The 
BEGIN 
  INTEGER i 
  PROCEDURE DFS(v,u); COMMENT v is the father of u 
  BEGIN 
     NUMBER(v):=i:=i+1 
     Calculate the probability of the father of v ; COMMENT junction tree algorithm 
     FOR v has a father w with the probability more than the threshold DO 
       BEGIN 
        IF w is not yet numbered THEN 
           BEGIN 
           DFS(w,v); 
       END; 
    END; 
    i:=0; 
    DFS(s,0)                        ; COMMENT s is an abnormal variable node 
END;
decision algorithm is proposed by Yang & Xiao (2008a), in which the generation and 
reduction method of the rules are related to the structure of the SDG model. The main steps 
are listed as follows: 
 (1) List all the possible rules as Table A (as Table 3), with each row denoting a rule 
  , where   denotes the values of the condition attributes are assumed and   
denotes the decision to be obtained. For convenience, we can give each attribute value 
a notion. 
 
Attributes Q 
Objects X  
Condition attributes 
C 
Decision attributes 
D 
   
Table 3. The framework of a decision table 
 
(2) Try to delete each condition attribute in turn and test the consistency of the formula 
and obtain the reducts and the core. Delete all the elements except the cores and get 
Table B. There are several methods to test the consistency. For example, 
(a) Each condition class EX|IND(C) has the same decision value. 
(b) For each object x, the condition class covering x is contained in the decision class 
covering x.  
(c) For every two decision rules    and ' '  , we have ' '      . 
(3) Calculate the reducts of each rule by use of Table B, and get Table C. 
(4) Delete redundant rules and thus get Table D. 
(5) Educe the rules and the decision algorithm according to Table D. 
The authors combine the algebraic and logical expression ways to achieve the purpose. 
Moreover, due to the convenience of expressing granularity, the decision algorithm is still 
applicable when the types of the faults of concern are changed or reformed. 
 
4. Sensor Location Problem Based on SDGs 
 
4.1 Performance Criteria of Fault Detection 
 
4.1.1 The dynamic SDG and fault reachability 
In actual systems, the fault propagation needs time, which effects the fault detection 
performance. So we take into account the fault propagation time for each branch and form 
the dynamic SDG (Yang & Xiao, 2008b). If the variable denoted by the node n1 has a direct 
influence on the variable denoted by n2, and after a time period for the fault propagation the 
fault revealed, then we define this time period τ (n1, n2) as the fault propagation time 
between n1 and n2, as shown in Fig. 15. Obviously, we have τ (n1, n2) ≥0. A path starting from 
n1 and ending at nm (denoted as l (n1  nm)) holds the overall fault propagation time τ 
(n1 nm) which is the summation of time τ (ni, nj) of each branch in this path, as shown in 
Fig. 15. Note that this is a simplified treatment, which fits the case of pure propagation delay, 
but when the dynamic properties are complex, the overall time may slightly decrease due to 
the effects of intermediate transients (Yang & Xiao, 2006a). 
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We can use Bayesian inference on the graph to calculate the probabilities; it is a direct 
method. Suppose that the node set of the probabilistic SDG is V E F H   , in which E  is 
the subset of evidence nodes whose value or probabilities are known, F  is the subset of 
query nodes whose probabilities are to be computed, and H  is the subset of hidden nodes 
which is not cared about in the inference. The inference process of is to compute the 
conditional probability of Fx  given the known Ex . 
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To solve this problem, Bayesian formula and its chain rule should be used adequately, and 
also the junction tree algorithm can be used for multiple fault origin cases. This method 
could be used where there are distinct random phenomenon, both for fault detection and 
HAZOP (Yang & Xiao, 2006b), but the cycles in SDGs should be handled. The algorithm is 
the combination of depth-first search and junction tree algorithm, written as pseudo code: 
 
  
On the other hand, rule-based inference (Kramer & Palowitch, 1987) is applicable when 
expert system is available. This method can be used to improve the inference accuracy with 
the appropriate rule description and operation. Rough set theory provides an idea of 
handling vague information and can be used to data reduction, thus it can be introduced to 
the fault isolation problem (a kind of decision problems) to optimize the decision rules. The 
BEGIN 
  INTEGER i 
  PROCEDURE DFS(v,u); COMMENT v is the father of u 
  BEGIN 
     NUMBER(v):=i:=i+1 
     Calculate the probability of the father of v ; COMMENT junction tree algorithm 
     FOR v has a father w with the probability more than the threshold DO 
       BEGIN 
        IF w is not yet numbered THEN 
           BEGIN 
           DFS(w,v); 
       END; 
    END; 
    i:=0; 
    DFS(s,0)                        ; COMMENT s is an abnormal variable node 
END;
decision algorithm is proposed by Yang & Xiao (2008a), in which the generation and 
reduction method of the rules are related to the structure of the SDG model. The main steps 
are listed as follows: 
 (1) List all the possible rules as Table A (as Table 3), with each row denoting a rule 
  , where   denotes the values of the condition attributes are assumed and   
denotes the decision to be obtained. For convenience, we can give each attribute value 
a notion. 
 
Attributes Q 
Objects X  
Condition attributes 
C 
Decision attributes 
D 
   
Table 3. The framework of a decision table 
 
(2) Try to delete each condition attribute in turn and test the consistency of the formula 
and obtain the reducts and the core. Delete all the elements except the cores and get 
Table B. There are several methods to test the consistency. For example, 
(a) Each condition class EX|IND(C) has the same decision value. 
(b) For each object x, the condition class covering x is contained in the decision class 
covering x.  
(c) For every two decision rules    and ' '  , we have ' '      . 
(3) Calculate the reducts of each rule by use of Table B, and get Table C. 
(4) Delete redundant rules and thus get Table D. 
(5) Educe the rules and the decision algorithm according to Table D. 
The authors combine the algebraic and logical expression ways to achieve the purpose. 
Moreover, due to the convenience of expressing granularity, the decision algorithm is still 
applicable when the types of the faults of concern are changed or reformed. 
 
4. Sensor Location Problem Based on SDGs 
 
4.1 Performance Criteria of Fault Detection 
 
4.1.1 The dynamic SDG and fault reachability 
In actual systems, the fault propagation needs time, which effects the fault detection 
performance. So we take into account the fault propagation time for each branch and form 
the dynamic SDG (Yang & Xiao, 2008b). If the variable denoted by the node n1 has a direct 
influence on the variable denoted by n2, and after a time period for the fault propagation the 
fault revealed, then we define this time period τ (n1, n2) as the fault propagation time 
between n1 and n2, as shown in Fig. 15. Obviously, we have τ (n1, n2) ≥0. A path starting from 
n1 and ending at nm (denoted as l (n1  nm)) holds the overall fault propagation time τ 
(n1 nm) which is the summation of time τ (ni, nj) of each branch in this path, as shown in 
Fig. 15. Note that this is a simplified treatment, which fits the case of pure propagation delay, 
but when the dynamic properties are complex, the overall time may slightly decrease due to 
the effects of intermediate transients (Yang & Xiao, 2006a). 
 
www.intechopen.com
Fault Detection34
 Fig. 15. Propagation time of a consistent branch and a consistent path 
Because the nodes in SDGs are classified into two types – variables and fault origins, we 
denote them as nis and fjs respectively. When a fault occurs, it is propagated along the 
consistent paths together with the time progress. 
Definition 4: Starting from the fault node f, after the time t, the set of nodes affected by f is 
 
 and( , ) : ( ) ( )R f t m l f m f m t     (32) 
 
where t is the fault propagation time. If n∈R(f, t), then we say, node n is reachable from fault f 
in time period t. Obviously, when time proceeds, the set of affected nodes expands, thus R (f, 
t1) R (f, t2), if t1 < t2. 
The basic criteria of fault detection are detectability and identifiability to assure the faults be 
detected and identified from each other. The concepts here are the extension of the concepts 
in the framework of the SDG. 
 
4.1.2 Fault detectability and detection time 
A fault should be detected by at least one sensor in a short enough time period. Below is the 
definition. 
Definition 5: If there exist at least one sensor located in the nodes of R (f, t) (measuring the 
corresponding variables), then we say that the fault f is detectable in the time period t. The 
time needed to detect a fault by these sensors is called the detection time TD (f).  
For each sensor, the time needed to detect a fault f can be calculated by shortest path 
algorithm. Among all these sensors, the shortest time is recorded as TD (f). The number of 
nodes with sensors in R (f, t) is called the degree of detectability. 
Based on the traditional SDG, only leaf nodes are needed to consider whether or not to 
locate sensors (Raghuraj et al., 1999). Then we have the following theorem. 
Theorem 1: Based on the SDG, disregarding the cases that some variables cannot be 
measured, sensors need to be located only on the leaf nodes. 
Corollary 1: In the framework of dynamic SDG with propagation time, the sensors need to 
be located on only leaf nodes of R (f, t). 
 
4.1.3 Fault identifiability and identification time 
Different faults have different behaviors. Represented in the SDG, the reachable nodes are 
different. So we must put sensors on these different nodes to identify the different faults. 
Below is the definition. 
Definition 6: If there exist at least one sensor on the nodes of R (f1, t) (measuring 
corresponding variables), and these sensor nodes are not within the nodes of R (f1, t), in 
other words, if there are sensors in the nodes of I (f1, f2, t) = R (f1, t)  R(f2, t) ﹣R (f1, t) ∩ R (f2, t), 
then we say that the faults f1 and f2 are identifiable in the time period t. The time needed to 
identify two faults by these sensors is called the identification time TI (f1, f2). 
...n n n1 2 m
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Detectability and identifiability are two independent concepts. We can understand easily, 
when two faults are both detectable, they may not be identifiable. On the other hand, 
identifiability does not imply detectability generally, because we can place only one sensor 
to identify them too. But usually we assume that only when the faults are detectable, they 
can be considered for identifiability. Thus the identifiability condition is stronger. In 
Definition 3, I (f1, f2, t), for two identifiable faults, must have more than one element. The 
number of nodes with sensors in I (f1, f2, t) is called the degree of identifiability. Besides, we 
have 
Proposition 1: TI (f1, f2) ≥ max{TD (f1), TD (f2)}. 
Proposition 2: The number of elements in I (f1, f2, t) is not necessarily increasing 
monotonically with time t. 
It should be noted that the signs of the nodes and branches can help identify different faults 
because some sensors are not only able to activate the alarm, but also indicate the direction 
of the departure from the normal values. For this case, we could change a node into two, one 
shows the higher reading, another shows the lower reading (Wilcox & Himmelblau, 1994). 
Then the above definition and the following rules can be applied. 
 
4.1.4 Detectability and identifiability with multiple faults 
Sometimes we also need to deal with the case of multiple simultaneous faults. It can be dealt 
with by node set transformation.  
Here we take two faults as an example. If the faults fi and fj occur at the same time, their 
reachable node set is Ri  Rj, so we can take these 2nC  node sets to be considered besides the 
sets of Ri, then the problem is transformed into the detectability and identifiability problems 
with a single fault.  
Obviously, if each fault can be identified, but when several faults occur at the same time, 
they are not assured to be identified. How about the inverse proposition? 
Theorem 2: If the case of n simultaneous faults can be identified, then the case of less than n 
simultaneous faults can be also identified. 
 
4.1.5 Fault detection reliability 
Detectability and identifiability are necessary conditions for fault detection. However the 
sensor readings are not always reliable, which affects the reliability of fault detection. Let Fis 
(i=1, 2, …, n) and Sjs (j=1,2,…,m) denote system faults and process variables measured by 
sensors individually. They can be shown as a bipartite graph with all the arcs directed from 
the fault set to the process variable set as shown in Fig. 16. Based on the detectablity 
criterion, there should be at least one arc departing from every fault node, and based on the 
identifiability criterion, the connected sensor nodes of different fault nodes should be 
different. The fault occurrence probabilities of the fault Fi is fi, while the sensor missed alarm 
rate and false alarm rate of variable Sj is uj and vj. The influence relation from fault Fi to 
sensor Sj is denoted by reachability dij (0 or 1) where 1 means reachable and 0 means 
unreachable. Because of the causal relations between process variables, the reachability 
includes direct and indirect influences.  
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 Fig. 15. Propagation time of a consistent branch and a consistent path 
Because the nodes in SDGs are classified into two types – variables and fault origins, we 
denote them as nis and fjs respectively. When a fault occurs, it is propagated along the 
consistent paths together with the time progress. 
Definition 4: Starting from the fault node f, after the time t, the set of nodes affected by f is 
 
 and( , ) : ( ) ( )R f t m l f m f m t     (32) 
 
where t is the fault propagation time. If n∈R(f, t), then we say, node n is reachable from fault f 
in time period t. Obviously, when time proceeds, the set of affected nodes expands, thus R (f, 
t1) R (f, t2), if t1 < t2. 
The basic criteria of fault detection are detectability and identifiability to assure the faults be 
detected and identified from each other. The concepts here are the extension of the concepts 
in the framework of the SDG. 
 
4.1.2 Fault detectability and detection time 
A fault should be detected by at least one sensor in a short enough time period. Below is the 
definition. 
Definition 5: If there exist at least one sensor located in the nodes of R (f, t) (measuring the 
corresponding variables), then we say that the fault f is detectable in the time period t. The 
time needed to detect a fault by these sensors is called the detection time TD (f).  
For each sensor, the time needed to detect a fault f can be calculated by shortest path 
algorithm. Among all these sensors, the shortest time is recorded as TD (f). The number of 
nodes with sensors in R (f, t) is called the degree of detectability. 
Based on the traditional SDG, only leaf nodes are needed to consider whether or not to 
locate sensors (Raghuraj et al., 1999). Then we have the following theorem. 
Theorem 1: Based on the SDG, disregarding the cases that some variables cannot be 
measured, sensors need to be located only on the leaf nodes. 
Corollary 1: In the framework of dynamic SDG with propagation time, the sensors need to 
be located on only leaf nodes of R (f, t). 
 
4.1.3 Fault identifiability and identification time 
Different faults have different behaviors. Represented in the SDG, the reachable nodes are 
different. So we must put sensors on these different nodes to identify the different faults. 
Below is the definition. 
Definition 6: If there exist at least one sensor on the nodes of R (f1, t) (measuring 
corresponding variables), and these sensor nodes are not within the nodes of R (f1, t), in 
other words, if there are sensors in the nodes of I (f1, f2, t) = R (f1, t)  R(f2, t) ﹣R (f1, t) ∩ R (f2, t), 
then we say that the faults f1 and f2 are identifiable in the time period t. The time needed to 
identify two faults by these sensors is called the identification time TI (f1, f2). 
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Detectability and identifiability are two independent concepts. We can understand easily, 
when two faults are both detectable, they may not be identifiable. On the other hand, 
identifiability does not imply detectability generally, because we can place only one sensor 
to identify them too. But usually we assume that only when the faults are detectable, they 
can be considered for identifiability. Thus the identifiability condition is stronger. In 
Definition 3, I (f1, f2, t), for two identifiable faults, must have more than one element. The 
number of nodes with sensors in I (f1, f2, t) is called the degree of identifiability. Besides, we 
have 
Proposition 1: TI (f1, f2) ≥ max{TD (f1), TD (f2)}. 
Proposition 2: The number of elements in I (f1, f2, t) is not necessarily increasing 
monotonically with time t. 
It should be noted that the signs of the nodes and branches can help identify different faults 
because some sensors are not only able to activate the alarm, but also indicate the direction 
of the departure from the normal values. For this case, we could change a node into two, one 
shows the higher reading, another shows the lower reading (Wilcox & Himmelblau, 1994). 
Then the above definition and the following rules can be applied. 
 
4.1.4 Detectability and identifiability with multiple faults 
Sometimes we also need to deal with the case of multiple simultaneous faults. It can be dealt 
with by node set transformation.  
Here we take two faults as an example. If the faults fi and fj occur at the same time, their 
reachable node set is Ri  Rj, so we can take these 2nC  node sets to be considered besides the 
sets of Ri, then the problem is transformed into the detectability and identifiability problems 
with a single fault.  
Obviously, if each fault can be identified, but when several faults occur at the same time, 
they are not assured to be identified. How about the inverse proposition? 
Theorem 2: If the case of n simultaneous faults can be identified, then the case of less than n 
simultaneous faults can be also identified. 
 
4.1.5 Fault detection reliability 
Detectability and identifiability are necessary conditions for fault detection. However the 
sensor readings are not always reliable, which affects the reliability of fault detection. Let Fis 
(i=1, 2, …, n) and Sjs (j=1,2,…,m) denote system faults and process variables measured by 
sensors individually. They can be shown as a bipartite graph with all the arcs directed from 
the fault set to the process variable set as shown in Fig. 16. Based on the detectablity 
criterion, there should be at least one arc departing from every fault node, and based on the 
identifiability criterion, the connected sensor nodes of different fault nodes should be 
different. The fault occurrence probabilities of the fault Fi is fi, while the sensor missed alarm 
rate and false alarm rate of variable Sj is uj and vj. The influence relation from fault Fi to 
sensor Sj is denoted by reachability dij (0 or 1) where 1 means reachable and 0 means 
unreachable. Because of the causal relations between process variables, the reachability 
includes direct and indirect influences.  
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Fig. 16. Bipartite graph to show the relations between faults and sensors 
 
As shown in Fig. 17, the confusion matrix reflects the true/false classification of alarms 
(Izadi eta al. 2009). The entries in the matrix are the number of true alarms (TA), false alarms 
(FA), missed alarms (MA) and true no-alarms (TN). These numbers can be obtained by 
experiments. The missed alarm rate of sensor Sj is uj which can be calculated by 
MA/(TA+MA), and false alarm rate of vj can be calculated by FA/(FA+TN). These rates are 
determined by the sensor quality and the threshold selection. 
 
Fig. 17. Confusion matrix to show the terminology of missed alarms and false alarms 
 
For each fault Fi, we should minimize its probability of not being detected. Because it is 
propagated to many other variables on which the sensors can also detect it, the 
undetectability of Fi occurs only when all the variables miss alarms. Besides, the redundant 
sensors on the same variables are also helpful for the improvement. We define the 
undetectability probability (Bhushan & Rengaswamy, 2002) of Fi as 
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where xj is the integer number of sensors put on the variable j. If there is no sensor on 
variable j, xj is zero. Obviously, when xj with the corresponding nonzero dij increases, Ui 
decreases. So adding sensors will increase the reliability.  
On the other hand, we think about the false alarm problem. For the variable Sj, adding a 
sensor with false alarm rate vj (with respect to fault Fi) will be accompanied with the 
increase of the following false alarm probability 
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which means the sensor reading gives the alarm even though no faults occur. 
The calculations of missed alarms and false alarms are dual problems that adding sensors 
will reduce the undetectability whilst increasing the false alarm probability. Here the false 
alarm probability reflects the influence of a sensor’s false alarm on the whole system. 
 
4.2 Sensor Location Based on Fault Detectability and Identifiability 
The purpose of the sensor location problem is to choose sensors and design the sensor 
location to meet the demands of fault detection. Neglecting the reliability problem, here we 
deal with the detectability and identifiability problems. In the framework of the static SDG, 
the problem can be solved directly. But in the framework of dynamic SDG, the arising times 
of various faults are various, and different faults may interact, so it is hard to analyze all the 
cases of fault propagation or even solve the sensor location problem in advance. One 
possible way is to embed the sensor location problem in the forward inference process as the 
following algorithm: 
(1) Add fault node fi to the evidence node set E and the reachable node set Ri. Set the 
inference system time Tsys to zero. 
(2) Check if the evidence node set is empty. If it is empty, then go to the end, otherwise 
go on. 
(3) From the evidence nodes, choose the nodes in the reachable node set for one forward 
step, and add them to the reachable node set RE of the evidence nodes. Meanwhile, 
update their detection time TD (fi) (detection time of the starting node of the branch 
plus the propagation time on the branch). 
(4) From the nodes in RE, choose one with the shortest detection time Tk and the nodes to 
be updated, kTN , at time Tk. 
(5) Tsys = Tsys + Tk. Make forward inference from all the nodes in kTN  for one step. 
(6) Add kTN  to the evidence node set E and reachable node set Ri. 
(7) If an evidence node whose one-step reachable nodes are all updated, then delete this 
node from E. 
(8) Placing sensors in the reachable node set Ri can assure the detectability of fault i, and 
placing sensors in Ri  Rj ﹣Ri∩Rj can assure the identifiability of fault i and j. 
(9) If a new fault has occurred, then add its corresponding node to the evidence node set 
E, and set Tsys as the current time. Go to step (2). 
Note that the treatment in step (3) is not accurate because the detection time is just 
approximate. So we often increase the threshold of the degree of detectability and 
identifiability to assure performance is optimal. 
 
4.3 Sensor Location Based on Fault Detection Reliability 
The two criteria, detectability and identifiability should be met at first when deciding the 
sensor location. Besides above algorithm, Yang and Xiao (2008b) also proposed some useful 
rules to solve this problem in consideration of the propagation time, which is a stricter 
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Fig. 16. Bipartite graph to show the relations between faults and sensors 
 
As shown in Fig. 17, the confusion matrix reflects the true/false classification of alarms 
(Izadi eta al. 2009). The entries in the matrix are the number of true alarms (TA), false alarms 
(FA), missed alarms (MA) and true no-alarms (TN). These numbers can be obtained by 
experiments. The missed alarm rate of sensor Sj is uj which can be calculated by 
MA/(TA+MA), and false alarm rate of vj can be calculated by FA/(FA+TN). These rates are 
determined by the sensor quality and the threshold selection. 
 
Fig. 17. Confusion matrix to show the terminology of missed alarms and false alarms 
 
For each fault Fi, we should minimize its probability of not being detected. Because it is 
propagated to many other variables on which the sensors can also detect it, the 
undetectability of Fi occurs only when all the variables miss alarms. Besides, the redundant 
sensors on the same variables are also helpful for the improvement. We define the 
undetectability probability (Bhushan & Rengaswamy, 2002) of Fi as 
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where xj is the integer number of sensors put on the variable j. If there is no sensor on 
variable j, xj is zero. Obviously, when xj with the corresponding nonzero dij increases, Ui 
decreases. So adding sensors will increase the reliability.  
On the other hand, we think about the false alarm problem. For the variable Sj, adding a 
sensor with false alarm rate vj (with respect to fault Fi) will be accompanied with the 
increase of the following false alarm probability 
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which means the sensor reading gives the alarm even though no faults occur. 
The calculations of missed alarms and false alarms are dual problems that adding sensors 
will reduce the undetectability whilst increasing the false alarm probability. Here the false 
alarm probability reflects the influence of a sensor’s false alarm on the whole system. 
 
4.2 Sensor Location Based on Fault Detectability and Identifiability 
The purpose of the sensor location problem is to choose sensors and design the sensor 
location to meet the demands of fault detection. Neglecting the reliability problem, here we 
deal with the detectability and identifiability problems. In the framework of the static SDG, 
the problem can be solved directly. But in the framework of dynamic SDG, the arising times 
of various faults are various, and different faults may interact, so it is hard to analyze all the 
cases of fault propagation or even solve the sensor location problem in advance. One 
possible way is to embed the sensor location problem in the forward inference process as the 
following algorithm: 
(1) Add fault node fi to the evidence node set E and the reachable node set Ri. Set the 
inference system time Tsys to zero. 
(2) Check if the evidence node set is empty. If it is empty, then go to the end, otherwise 
go on. 
(3) From the evidence nodes, choose the nodes in the reachable node set for one forward 
step, and add them to the reachable node set RE of the evidence nodes. Meanwhile, 
update their detection time TD (fi) (detection time of the starting node of the branch 
plus the propagation time on the branch). 
(4) From the nodes in RE, choose one with the shortest detection time Tk and the nodes to 
be updated, kTN , at time Tk. 
(5) Tsys = Tsys + Tk. Make forward inference from all the nodes in kTN  for one step. 
(6) Add kTN  to the evidence node set E and reachable node set Ri. 
(7) If an evidence node whose one-step reachable nodes are all updated, then delete this 
node from E. 
(8) Placing sensors in the reachable node set Ri can assure the detectability of fault i, and 
placing sensors in Ri  Rj ﹣Ri∩Rj can assure the identifiability of fault i and j. 
(9) If a new fault has occurred, then add its corresponding node to the evidence node set 
E, and set Tsys as the current time. Go to step (2). 
Note that the treatment in step (3) is not accurate because the detection time is just 
approximate. So we often increase the threshold of the degree of detectability and 
identifiability to assure performance is optimal. 
 
4.3 Sensor Location Based on Fault Detection Reliability 
The two criteria, detectability and identifiability should be met at first when deciding the 
sensor location. Besides above algorithm, Yang and Xiao (2008b) also proposed some useful 
rules to solve this problem in consideration of the propagation time, which is a stricter 
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requirement than that mentioned above. The sensor location obtained has the minimum 
number of sensors required for fault detection. Since the increase of sensors will not destroy 
these criteria, the following optimization algorithm should be based on this location and try 
to find the crucial variables for putting additional sensors.  
In the trade-off between false alarms and missed alarms, missed alarms are often considered 
to be more important because we do not want to lose a real fault. Thus the algorithm 
handles this criterion first. Meanwhile, we hope the false alarm rates to be as small as 
possible, so we integrate the treatment of false alarms into the whole algorithm.  
If we consider all the faults, then we want to minimize the total undetectability probabilities 
for all the faults, each one of which is a probability that no sensors give the alarm for the 
corresponding fault. Thus we have the following optimization problem: 
 
1
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j
n
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U

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This optimization problem cannot be solved at once (by branch and bound method or other 
methods) for the following reasons. First, this problem does not have a continuous solution 
space; instead it is an integer programming problem. Thus we should update the solution (xj, 
j=1,…,m) once at an integer. Secondly, the problem has constraints. For example, putting a 
sensor on a variable needs some cost, and the total cost should be limited within a range, so 
we have 
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where cj is the cost to be paid when putting a sensor on variable j, and C0 is the cost limit. 
Thirdly, the initial value of the problem is obtained according to the criteria of detectability 
and identifiability, and the xjs should not be negative, which can be regarded as another 
constraint. Sometimes we have more constraints such as the number limit of sensors. This 
algorithm is just used to reduce the undetectability by adding sensors at critical location. 
Thus the problem is solved by an iterative algorithm, and within each step we should only 
add 1 to one of the xjs and check the constraints. This is a heuristic algorithm. 
Besides, false alarm problem can also be formalized as an integer optimization problem: 
1
min
j
m
j jx j
x V

     (37) 
 
but this problem is accompanied with the undetectability optimization problem and is less 
important for most cases. Thus we do not take it as an individual problem but as a 
supplement to the above problem expressed by the following formulation 
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where   is a constant coefficient. 
When trying to reduce the undetectability by adding a sensor, one is concerned not with the 
total number of missed alarms but the number for each fault. Thus the summation in Eq. (35) 
can be replaced by a weighted summation, where the weights correspond to the importance. 
The weights are not impersonal or rational to obtain, so we can alternatively use the 
maximization to deal with the bottleneck which is the fault with maximal undetectability. 
Hence we have the following optimization problem as a combination of a minimaxization 
and a linear minimization 
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If less attention is paid to the false alarm rate, we can take its optimization as a constraint 
and just set a limit V0 instead of optimization. Then we get the simplified algorithm: 
(1) Initialization: 
(a) Get fi, uj and vj by a priori knowledge and measurements. 
(b) Get dij from SDG or reachability matrix. 
(c) Get the minimal xjs according to the criteria of detectability and identifiability as 
the starting point. 
(d) Calculate Vj by Eq. (34). 
(e) Calculate V by summation of all the Vjs with xj is not 0. 
(2) Calculate Ui and select the maximal one UI. 
(3) Let the set of js with dIj is 1 as AI = max{j|dIj=1}. 
(4) Select the maximal uJ from AI, i.e. uJ = max AI. If AI is empty, stop. If there is more 
than one maximum element, select the one with smallest Vj. 
(5) Put a sensor on variable J, xJ ← xJ +1. 
(6) Update the false alarm rate V←V+Vj, and see if it is tolerable. If so, go on; if not, 
delete J from AI and go to step (4).  
(7) Check the constraints. If they are met, go on; if not, delete j from AI and go to step (4). 
(8) Go to step 2 and update the undetectability. 
The algorithm is illustrated as a flow chart in Fig. 18. 
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Fig. 18. Flow chart of the optimization algorithm. 
 
5. Case Study 
 
We take a 100 MW generator set process in a power plant as an example, which is composed 
of a typical natural-circulation steam boiler and a turbine. The system is operated and 
controlled by a DCS of MACS-II.  
The process can be divided into several sub-systems such as water & steam system, coal & 
air system, and turbine system. The core flowsheet is shown in Fig. 19. 
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Fig. 18. Flow chart of the optimization algorithm. 
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5.1 SDG Model Description of the Generator Set Process 
As listed in Table 4, the major variables are controlled in separated systems. Note that the 
control system of oxygen percentage in the smoke is not included here because it is so 
complex that it is usually operated manually. And the control systems of water level of 
condensator, deoxidizor and exchangers are also not included because they are operated in 
independent single control loops that can be separated from the whole graph. Thus, the top-
level SDG model is composed of several super-nodes in which we are only concerned about 
the major ones corresponding to the 5 controlled variables. 
 
Control 
system Description 
Controlled 
variable 
Tag 
name 
Operating 
value 
S1 Water level control by manipulating 
inlet water flow 
Water level of 
the top steam 
drum 
L1 0 mm 
S2 Overheated steam flow control by 
throttle valve to maintain the turbine 
rev 
Turbine torque M  
S3 Overheated steam temperature 
control by manipulating the cooling 
water valve 
Overheated 
steam 
temperature 
T1 535 oC 
S4 Overheated steam pressure control 
by manipulating the transducer 
frequency of coal powder distributor 
Overheated 
steam pressure 
P2 8.83 MPa 
S5 Hearth pressure control by 
manipulating the fan baffle 
Hearth pressure P0 -50 Pa 
Table 4. Controlled variables in the generator set process 
 
The other variables in the process are listed as Table 5. We model the middle-level SDG of 
the system shown as Fig. 20. In the bottom level, control systems in S2–S5 are single loops in 
nature, whose SDGs are shown as Fig. 21(a)-(d).  
 
Fig. 20. Middle-level SDG model of the generator set process 
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Tag name  Variable Operating value 
F1 Inlet water flow 360 t/h 
F2 Cooling water flow 10 t/h 
F3 Overheated steam flow 370 t/h 
F4 Exit smoke flow  
P0 Furnace negative pressure  
P1 Steam drum pressure 10 Mpa 
P2 Superheated steam pressure  
P3 Inlet water pressure 12 Mpa 
P4 Cooling water pressure 12 Mpa 
P5 Primary total air pressure 1.4 kPa 
P6 Blower exit air pressure  
P7 Coal powder exhauster exit air pressure  
P8 Coal powder exhauster inlet air pressure  
T2 Hearth temperature  
T3 Exit smoke temperature 150 oC 
T4 Primary air temperature  
T5 Primary air exit temperature  
T6 Primary air inlet temperature  
T7 Coal milling machine exit air temperature 68 oC 
T8 Inlet water temperature 215 oC 
V1 Transducer frequency of coal powder distributor  
V2 Turbine rev  
N1 Turbine power 100 MW 
N2 Turbine load 100 MW 
A Oxygen percentage in the smoke 5.8 % 
C1 Cooling water valve   
C2 Primary fan baffle  
C3 Blower baffle  
C4 Coal powder exhauster baffle  
C5 Draught fan baffle  
C6 Inlet water valve  
C7 Main throttle valve  
Table 5. Other variables in the generator set process 
 
In S1, the three-element control of the water level is used, in which the main controlled 
variable is L1. If we take steam flow F3 and inlet water flow F1 into account, the control 
system is a feedforward-cascade system, as shown in Fig. 22(a). In the initial stage of the 
disturbance, the SDG is shown as Fig. 22(b), which can be derived by DAEs. Certainly the 
initial fault influence follows this SDG.  
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Fig. 21. Bottom-level SDGs of the generator set process. (a) S2, (b) S3, (c) S4, (d) S5 
Fig. 22. Three-element water level control system. (a) Block diagram, (b) SDG 
 
By combing the above sub-SDGs, the whole SDG of the generator process is shown as Fig. 23 
where the red arcs stand for the control actions (Yang, 2008). 
 
5.2 Fault Analysis of the Generator Set Process 
When fault occurs, symptoms can be explained by SDG inference. Typical faults and their 
fault propagation paths are summarized as Table 6. Along the paths we can find the possible 
fault origins. 
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 Fig. 23. Single-level SDG of the generator set process. 
 
Fault Fault propagation path in middle level 
Fault propagation path in 
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drum S1 F1(+)→L1(+) 
Lack of water in steam 
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Too large of draught fan 
baffle S5 C5(+)→F4(+)→P0(-) 
Increase of load S2 N2(+)→C7(+)→F3(+) M(-)→V2(-)→N1(-)→C7(+) 
Change of coal quality 
S4→S5 
S4→T3 
S4→S3→S2→S1 
T2(+)→P1(+)→P2(+) 
Table 6. Typical faults and their fault propagation paths 
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Fig. 21. Bottom-level SDGs of the generator set process. (a) S2, (b) S3, (c) S4, (d) S5 
Fig. 22. Three-element water level control system. (a) Block diagram, (b) SDG 
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In the case of coal quality change, from the middle-level inference we find the fault origin is 
located in S4. Thus we just go on to make inference in the SDG of S4 and ignore other 
symptoms. If we make inference in a single-level SDG, then there are other paths (shown in 
Fig. 22) that are all redundant for fault origin search: 
T2(+)→P0(+) 
T2(+)→T3(+) 
T2(+)→T1(+)→C1(+)→F2(+)→F3(+)→M(+)→V2(+)→N1(+) 
T2(+)→T1(+)→C1(+)→F2(+)→F3(+)→L1(-)→C6(-) 
However these paths are useful for hazard analysis.  In Fig. 24, some control arcs are deleted 
compared with Fig. 23 because they are usually performed manually in the application. 
From the propagation path, we find the hearth temperature T2 is the key variable, so adding 
sensors on it can improve the fault detection reliability. 
 
 Fig. 24. Fault propagation when coal quality changes 
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6. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, after the introduction of the SDG concept and modeling methods, the 
inference approaches aiming at the fault detection and hazard analysis, especially the SDG 
description of control systems, have been analyzed from theory to practice.  
The classical control methods on the basis of feedback idea are in common use, so the 
modeling and analysis of the systems under these control methods, have been discussed. 
When a control system is transformed into an SDG model, the direction of fault propagation 
in steady state may differ from the direction in initial response because of the control action. 
For a single-loop control system, the SDG is a directed path whose backbone is set point → 
measurement value → controlled variable → manipulated variable → controller output, 
which is also the fault propagation path and does not compose a loop. Based on this result, 
SDGs and fault propagation paths of various control systems can be obtained by the 
combination and connection of several single-loop control elements. Thus we do not have to 
list all the system equations when analyzing the actual problem, but only need to construct 
the local SDG for each separate control component and then combine them together, which 
is convenient for actual use. After analyzing the fault propagation paths in control systems, 
we can embed the resulted SDGs for initial response and final response into the SDG of the 
whole system and analyze the propagation paths considering the truncated or changed 
paths. This method enables the application of SDG method in large-scale complex systems. 
It is to be noted that model description should meet the actual needs but does not need to be 
too accurate. For example, the SDG-based qualitative analysis of the three-element control of 
the boiler water level usually do not refer to the details, so usually we only construct a single 
loop to describe the major problem and ignore the minor ones. In large-scale complex 
systems, however, SDG models can be adopted to describe the interactions between 
different parts and reveal the propagation for the use of fault analysis; it is the advantage of 
SDG models. 
In industrial systems, alarm monitoring design is a very important issue, among which the 
trade-off between missed alarms and false alarms should be treated appropriately. We 
should pay attention to two levels of design problems: In the local level, the threshold 
selection, data filtering and alarm triggering are the key problems to be solved. In the 
system level, topology expression and sensor location for alarm rationalization is essential. 
In this chapter, we have described and solved the sensor location problem aiming at the 
trade-off with the help of topology expressed by SDG. The optimization objective is 
expressed as the minimization of all the fault undetectabilities in the system. The false alarm 
rate is used as constraint as well as the cost limit.  
Our future work may include: standard modeling method using XML-based process 
knowledge, modeling and validation of SDGs using process data, and combination of 
qualitative fault propagation and quantitative diagnosis. 
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In the case of coal quality change, from the middle-level inference we find the fault origin is 
located in S4. Thus we just go on to make inference in the SDG of S4 and ignore other 
symptoms. If we make inference in a single-level SDG, then there are other paths (shown in 
Fig. 22) that are all redundant for fault origin search: 
T2(+)→P0(+) 
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T2(+)→T1(+)→C1(+)→F2(+)→F3(+)→L1(-)→C6(-) 
However these paths are useful for hazard analysis.  In Fig. 24, some control arcs are deleted 
compared with Fig. 23 because they are usually performed manually in the application. 
From the propagation path, we find the hearth temperature T2 is the key variable, so adding 
sensors on it can improve the fault detection reliability. 
 
 Fig. 24. Fault propagation when coal quality changes 
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6. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, after the introduction of the SDG concept and modeling methods, the 
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which is also the fault propagation path and does not compose a loop. Based on this result, 
SDGs and fault propagation paths of various control systems can be obtained by the 
combination and connection of several single-loop control elements. Thus we do not have to 
list all the system equations when analyzing the actual problem, but only need to construct 
the local SDG for each separate control component and then combine them together, which 
is convenient for actual use. After analyzing the fault propagation paths in control systems, 
we can embed the resulted SDGs for initial response and final response into the SDG of the 
whole system and analyze the propagation paths considering the truncated or changed 
paths. This method enables the application of SDG method in large-scale complex systems. 
It is to be noted that model description should meet the actual needs but does not need to be 
too accurate. For example, the SDG-based qualitative analysis of the three-element control of 
the boiler water level usually do not refer to the details, so usually we only construct a single 
loop to describe the major problem and ignore the minor ones. In large-scale complex 
systems, however, SDG models can be adopted to describe the interactions between 
different parts and reveal the propagation for the use of fault analysis; it is the advantage of 
SDG models. 
In industrial systems, alarm monitoring design is a very important issue, among which the 
trade-off between missed alarms and false alarms should be treated appropriately. We 
should pay attention to two levels of design problems: In the local level, the threshold 
selection, data filtering and alarm triggering are the key problems to be solved. In the 
system level, topology expression and sensor location for alarm rationalization is essential. 
In this chapter, we have described and solved the sensor location problem aiming at the 
trade-off with the help of topology expressed by SDG. The optimization objective is 
expressed as the minimization of all the fault undetectabilities in the system. The false alarm 
rate is used as constraint as well as the cost limit.  
Our future work may include: standard modeling method using XML-based process 
knowledge, modeling and validation of SDGs using process data, and combination of 
qualitative fault propagation and quantitative diagnosis. 
 
7. Acknowledgment 
 
The authors gratefully acknowledge the financial aid for this research by the National 
Natural Science Foundation of China (No. 60736026, 60904044), China Postdoctoral Science 
Foundation (No. 20080440386) and NSERC (Natural Sciences and Engineering Research 
Council of Canada) – Suncor – Matrikon – iCORE Industrial Research Chair Program. 
www.intechopen.com
Fault Detection48
8. References 
 
Bauer, M.; Cox, J.W.; Caveness, M.H.; Downs, J. & Thornhill, N.F. (2007). Finding the 
direction of disturbance propagation in a chemical process using transfer entropy. 
IEEE Transactions on Control Systems Technology, Vol. 15, No. 1, January 2007, pp. 12-
21, ISSN: 1063-6536 
Bhushan, M. & Rengaswamy, R. (2002). Comprehensive design of a sensor network for 
chemical plants based on various diagnosability and reliability criteria. 1. 
Framework. Industrial & Engineering Chemistry Research, Vol. 41, No. 7, April 2002, 
pp. 1826-1839, ISSN: 0888-5885 
Chang, C.C. & Yu, C.C. (1990). On-line fault diagnosis using the signed directed graph. 
Industrial & Engineering Chemistry Research, Vol. 29, No. 7, July 1990, pp. 1290-1299, 
ISSN: 0888-5885 
Chen, J. Y. & Chang, C.T. (2007). Systematic enumeration of fuzzy diagnosis rules for 
identifying multiple faults in chemical processes. Industrial & Engineering Chemistry 
Research, Vol. 46, No. 11, May 2007, pp. 3635-3655, ISSN: 0888-5885 
Gentil, S. & Montmain, J. (2004). Hierarchical representation of complex systems for 
supporting human decision making. Advanced Engineering Informatics, Vol. 18, No. 
3, July 2004, pp. 143–159, ISSN: 1474-0346 
Graphviz (2009). URL: http://www.graphviz.org 
Han, C.C.; Shih, R.F. & Lee, L.S. (1994). Quantifying signed directed graphs with the fuzzy 
set for fault diagnosis resolution improvement. Industrial & Engineering Chemistry 
Research, Vol. 33, No. 8, August 1994, pp. 1943-1954, ISSN: 0888-5885 
Iri, M.; Aoki, K.; O'shima, E. & Matsuyama, H. (1979). An algorithm for diagnosis of system 
failures in the chemical process. Computers & Chemical Engineering, Vol. 3, No. 1-4, 
1979, pp. 489–493, ISSN: 0098-1354 
Iri, M; Aoki, K.; O’Shima, E. & Matsuyama, H. (1980). A graphical approach to the problem 
of locating the origin of the system failure. Journal of the Operations Research Society 
of Japan, Vol. 23, No. 4, December 1980, pp. 295–311, ISSN: 0453-4514 
Izadi, I.; Shah, S.; Kondaveeti, S. & Chen, T. (2009). A framework for optimal design of alarm 
systems, Proceedings of 7th IFAC Symposium on Fault Detection, Supervision and Safety 
of Technical Processes, Barcelona, Spain, July 2009 
Jiang, H.; Patwardhan, R. & Shah, S. (2008). Root cause diagnosis of plant-wide oscillations 
using the adjacency matrix, Proceedings of 17th IFAC World Congress, pp. 13893-
13900, ISBN: 978-3-902661-00-5, Seoul, Korea, July 2008, Elsevier, Amsterdam 
Kramer, M.A. & Palowitch, B.L. (1987). A rule-based approach to fault diagnosis using the signed 
directed graph. AIChE Journal, Vol. 33, No. 7, July 1987, pp. 1607-1078, ISSN: 0001-1541 
Lee, G.; Tosukhowong, T.; Lee, J.H. & Han, C. (2006). Fault diagnosis using the hybrid 
method of signed digraph and partial least squares with time delay: the pulp mill 
process. Industrial & Engineering Chemistry Research, 2006, Vol. 45, No. , pp. 9061-
9074, ISSN: 0888-5885 
Mah, R.S.H. (1989). Chemical Process Structures and Information Flows. Butterworth Publishes, 
ISBN: 0-409-90175-X, Boston 
Maurya, M.R.; Rengaswamy, R. & Venkatasubramanian, V. (2003a). A systematic 
framework for the development and analysis of signed digraphs for chemical 
processes. 1. Algorithms and analysis. Industrial & Engineering Chemistry Research, 
Vol. 42, No. 20, October 2003, pp. 4789-4810, ISSN: 0888-5885 
Maurya, M.R.; Rengaswamy, R. & Venkatasubramanian, V. (2003b). A systematic framework 
for the development and analysis of signed digraphs for chemical processes. 2. 
Control loops and flowsheet analysis. Industrial & Engineering Chemistry Research, Vol. 
42, No. 20, October 2003, pp. 4811-4827, 2003, ISSN: 0888-5885 
Maurya, M.R.; Rengaswamy, R. & Venkatasubramanian, V. (2006). A signed directed graph-
based systematic framework for steady-state malfunction diagnosis inside control 
loops. Chemical Engineering Science, Vol. 61, No. 6, March 2006, pp. 1790-1810, ISSN: 
0009-2509 
McCoy, S.A.; Wakeman, S.J.; Larkin, F.D.; Chung, P.W.H. & Rushton, A.G. & Lees, F.P. 
(1999). HAZID, a computer aid for hazard identification. 1. The STOPHAZ package 
and the HAZID code: an overview, the issues and the structure. Transactions of the 
Institution of Chemical Engineers. Part B, Vol. 77, No. 6, November 1999, pp. 317-327, 
ISSN: 0957-5820 
Mylaraswamy, D. & Venkatasubramanian, V. (1997). A hybrid framework for large scale 
process fault diagnosis. Computer & Chemical Engineering, Vol. 21, No. Suppl., May 
1997, pp. S935-S940, ISSN: 0098-1354 
Oyeleye, O. O. & Kramer, M. A. (1988). Qualitative simulation of chemical process systems: 
steady-state analysis. AIChE Journal, Vol. 34, No. 9, September 1988, pp. 1441-1454, 
ISSN: 0001-1541 
Preisig, H. A.  (2009). A graph-theory-based approach to the analysis of large-scale plants. 
Computers & Chemical Engineering, Vol. 33, No. 3, March 2009, pp. 598-904, ISSN: 
0098-354 
Raghuraj, R.; Bhushan, M. & Rengaswamy, R. (1999). Locating sensors in complex chemical 
plants based on fault diagnostic observability criteria. AIChE Journal, Vol. 45, No. 2, 
February 1999, pp. 310-322, ISSN: 0001-1541 
Shiozaki, J.; Matsuyama, H.; O’Shima, E. & Iri, M. (1985). An improved algorithm for 
diagnosis of system failures in the chemical process. Computers & Chemical 
Engineering, Vol. 9, No. 3, pp. 285-293, ISSN: 0098-1354 
Shiozaki, J.; Shibata, B.; Matsuyama, H. & O’shima, E. (1989). Fault diagnosis of chemical 
processes utilizing signed directed graphs-improvement by using temporal 
information. IEEE Transactions on Industrial Electronics, Vol. 36, No. 4, November 
1989, pp. 469-474, ISSN: 0278-0046 
Takeda, K.; Shibata, B.; Tsuge, Y. & Matsuyama, H. (1995). Improvement of fault diagnostic 
system utilizing signed directed graph–the method using transfer delay of failure. 
Transactions of the Society of Instrument and Control Engineers, Vol. 31, No. 1, January 
1995, pp. 98–107, ISSN: 0453-4654 
Thambirajah, J.; Benabbas, L.; Bauer, M. & Thornhill, N. F. (2009). Cause-and-effect analysis 
in chemical processes utilizing XML, plant connectivity and quantitative process 
history. Computers & Chemical Engineering, Vol. 33, No. 2, February 2009, pp. 503-
512, ISSN: 0098-1354 
Vedam, H. & Venkatasubramanian, V. (1997). Signed digraph based multiple fault 
diagnosis. Computers & Chemical Engineering, Vol. 21, No. Suppl., May 1997, pp. 
S655-S660, ISSN: 0098-1354 
Vedam, H. & Venkatasubramanian, V. (1999). PCA-SDG based process monitoring and fault 
diagnosis. Control Engineering Practice, Vol. 7, No. 7, July 1999, pp. 903-917, ISSN: 
0967-0661 
www.intechopen.com
Qualitative Fault Detection and Hazard Analysis Based on  
Signed Directed Graphs for Large-Scale Complex Systems 49
8. References 
 
Bauer, M.; Cox, J.W.; Caveness, M.H.; Downs, J. & Thornhill, N.F. (2007). Finding the 
direction of disturbance propagation in a chemical process using transfer entropy. 
IEEE Transactions on Control Systems Technology, Vol. 15, No. 1, January 2007, pp. 12-
21, ISSN: 1063-6536 
Bhushan, M. & Rengaswamy, R. (2002). Comprehensive design of a sensor network for 
chemical plants based on various diagnosability and reliability criteria. 1. 
Framework. Industrial & Engineering Chemistry Research, Vol. 41, No. 7, April 2002, 
pp. 1826-1839, ISSN: 0888-5885 
Chang, C.C. & Yu, C.C. (1990). On-line fault diagnosis using the signed directed graph. 
Industrial & Engineering Chemistry Research, Vol. 29, No. 7, July 1990, pp. 1290-1299, 
ISSN: 0888-5885 
Chen, J. Y. & Chang, C.T. (2007). Systematic enumeration of fuzzy diagnosis rules for 
identifying multiple faults in chemical processes. Industrial & Engineering Chemistry 
Research, Vol. 46, No. 11, May 2007, pp. 3635-3655, ISSN: 0888-5885 
Gentil, S. & Montmain, J. (2004). Hierarchical representation of complex systems for 
supporting human decision making. Advanced Engineering Informatics, Vol. 18, No. 
3, July 2004, pp. 143–159, ISSN: 1474-0346 
Graphviz (2009). URL: http://www.graphviz.org 
Han, C.C.; Shih, R.F. & Lee, L.S. (1994). Quantifying signed directed graphs with the fuzzy 
set for fault diagnosis resolution improvement. Industrial & Engineering Chemistry 
Research, Vol. 33, No. 8, August 1994, pp. 1943-1954, ISSN: 0888-5885 
Iri, M.; Aoki, K.; O'shima, E. & Matsuyama, H. (1979). An algorithm for diagnosis of system 
failures in the chemical process. Computers & Chemical Engineering, Vol. 3, No. 1-4, 
1979, pp. 489–493, ISSN: 0098-1354 
Iri, M; Aoki, K.; O’Shima, E. & Matsuyama, H. (1980). A graphical approach to the problem 
of locating the origin of the system failure. Journal of the Operations Research Society 
of Japan, Vol. 23, No. 4, December 1980, pp. 295–311, ISSN: 0453-4514 
Izadi, I.; Shah, S.; Kondaveeti, S. & Chen, T. (2009). A framework for optimal design of alarm 
systems, Proceedings of 7th IFAC Symposium on Fault Detection, Supervision and Safety 
of Technical Processes, Barcelona, Spain, July 2009 
Jiang, H.; Patwardhan, R. & Shah, S. (2008). Root cause diagnosis of plant-wide oscillations 
using the adjacency matrix, Proceedings of 17th IFAC World Congress, pp. 13893-
13900, ISBN: 978-3-902661-00-5, Seoul, Korea, July 2008, Elsevier, Amsterdam 
Kramer, M.A. & Palowitch, B.L. (1987). A rule-based approach to fault diagnosis using the signed 
directed graph. AIChE Journal, Vol. 33, No. 7, July 1987, pp. 1607-1078, ISSN: 0001-1541 
Lee, G.; Tosukhowong, T.; Lee, J.H. & Han, C. (2006). Fault diagnosis using the hybrid 
method of signed digraph and partial least squares with time delay: the pulp mill 
process. Industrial & Engineering Chemistry Research, 2006, Vol. 45, No. , pp. 9061-
9074, ISSN: 0888-5885 
Mah, R.S.H. (1989). Chemical Process Structures and Information Flows. Butterworth Publishes, 
ISBN: 0-409-90175-X, Boston 
Maurya, M.R.; Rengaswamy, R. & Venkatasubramanian, V. (2003a). A systematic 
framework for the development and analysis of signed digraphs for chemical 
processes. 1. Algorithms and analysis. Industrial & Engineering Chemistry Research, 
Vol. 42, No. 20, October 2003, pp. 4789-4810, ISSN: 0888-5885 
Maurya, M.R.; Rengaswamy, R. & Venkatasubramanian, V. (2003b). A systematic framework 
for the development and analysis of signed digraphs for chemical processes. 2. 
Control loops and flowsheet analysis. Industrial & Engineering Chemistry Research, Vol. 
42, No. 20, October 2003, pp. 4811-4827, 2003, ISSN: 0888-5885 
Maurya, M.R.; Rengaswamy, R. & Venkatasubramanian, V. (2006). A signed directed graph-
based systematic framework for steady-state malfunction diagnosis inside control 
loops. Chemical Engineering Science, Vol. 61, No. 6, March 2006, pp. 1790-1810, ISSN: 
0009-2509 
McCoy, S.A.; Wakeman, S.J.; Larkin, F.D.; Chung, P.W.H. & Rushton, A.G. & Lees, F.P. 
(1999). HAZID, a computer aid for hazard identification. 1. The STOPHAZ package 
and the HAZID code: an overview, the issues and the structure. Transactions of the 
Institution of Chemical Engineers. Part B, Vol. 77, No. 6, November 1999, pp. 317-327, 
ISSN: 0957-5820 
Mylaraswamy, D. & Venkatasubramanian, V. (1997). A hybrid framework for large scale 
process fault diagnosis. Computer & Chemical Engineering, Vol. 21, No. Suppl., May 
1997, pp. S935-S940, ISSN: 0098-1354 
Oyeleye, O. O. & Kramer, M. A. (1988). Qualitative simulation of chemical process systems: 
steady-state analysis. AIChE Journal, Vol. 34, No. 9, September 1988, pp. 1441-1454, 
ISSN: 0001-1541 
Preisig, H. A.  (2009). A graph-theory-based approach to the analysis of large-scale plants. 
Computers & Chemical Engineering, Vol. 33, No. 3, March 2009, pp. 598-904, ISSN: 
0098-354 
Raghuraj, R.; Bhushan, M. & Rengaswamy, R. (1999). Locating sensors in complex chemical 
plants based on fault diagnostic observability criteria. AIChE Journal, Vol. 45, No. 2, 
February 1999, pp. 310-322, ISSN: 0001-1541 
Shiozaki, J.; Matsuyama, H.; O’Shima, E. & Iri, M. (1985). An improved algorithm for 
diagnosis of system failures in the chemical process. Computers & Chemical 
Engineering, Vol. 9, No. 3, pp. 285-293, ISSN: 0098-1354 
Shiozaki, J.; Shibata, B.; Matsuyama, H. & O’shima, E. (1989). Fault diagnosis of chemical 
processes utilizing signed directed graphs-improvement by using temporal 
information. IEEE Transactions on Industrial Electronics, Vol. 36, No. 4, November 
1989, pp. 469-474, ISSN: 0278-0046 
Takeda, K.; Shibata, B.; Tsuge, Y. & Matsuyama, H. (1995). Improvement of fault diagnostic 
system utilizing signed directed graph–the method using transfer delay of failure. 
Transactions of the Society of Instrument and Control Engineers, Vol. 31, No. 1, January 
1995, pp. 98–107, ISSN: 0453-4654 
Thambirajah, J.; Benabbas, L.; Bauer, M. & Thornhill, N. F. (2009). Cause-and-effect analysis 
in chemical processes utilizing XML, plant connectivity and quantitative process 
history. Computers & Chemical Engineering, Vol. 33, No. 2, February 2009, pp. 503-
512, ISSN: 0098-1354 
Vedam, H. & Venkatasubramanian, V. (1997). Signed digraph based multiple fault 
diagnosis. Computers & Chemical Engineering, Vol. 21, No. Suppl., May 1997, pp. 
S655-S660, ISSN: 0098-1354 
Vedam, H. & Venkatasubramanian, V. (1999). PCA-SDG based process monitoring and fault 
diagnosis. Control Engineering Practice, Vol. 7, No. 7, July 1999, pp. 903-917, ISSN: 
0967-0661 
www.intechopen.com
Fault Detection50
Venkatasubramanian, V.; Rengaswamy, R. & Kavuri, S.N. (2003). A review of process fault 
detection and diagnosis. Part II: Qualitative models and search strategies. 
Computers & Chemical Engineering, Vol. 27, No. 3, March 2003, pp. 313-326, ISSN: 
0098-1354 
Venkatasubramanian, V.; Zhao, J. & Viswanathan, S. (2000). Intelligent system for HAZOP 
analysis of complex process plants. Computers & Chemical Engineering, Vol. 24, No. 
9-10, October 2000, pp. 2291-2302, ISSN: 0098-1354 
Wilcox, N.A. & Himmelblau, D.M. (1994). The possible cause and effect graphs (PCEG) 
model for fault diagnosis—I. Methodology. Computers & Chemical Engineering, Vol. 
18, No. 2, pp.103-116, February 1994, ISSN: 0098-1354 
Yang, F. (2008). Research on Dynamic Description and Inference Approaches in SDG Model-Based 
Fault Analysis [PhD Dissertation], Tsinghua University, Beijing 
Yang, F. & Xiao, D. (2005a). Review of SDG modeling and its application. Control Theory and 
Applications, Vol. 22, No. 9, October 2005, pp. 767-774, ISSN: 1000-8152 
Yang, F. & Xiao, D. (2005b). Approach to modeling of qualitative SDG model in large-scale 
complex systems. Control and Instruments in Chemical Industry, Vol. 32, No. 5, 
October 2005, pp. 8-11, ISSN: 1000-3932 
Yang, F. & Xiao, D. (2006a). Approach to fault diagnosis using SDG based on fault revealing 
time, Proceedings of the 6th World Congress on Intelligent Control and Automation, pp. 
5744-5747, ISBN: 1-4244-0332-4, Dalian, China, June 2006, IEEE, New York 
Yang, F. & Xiao, D. (2006b). Probabilistic signed directed graph and its application in hazard 
assessment, In: Progress in Safety Science and Technology (Vol. VI), Huang, P.; Wang, 
Y.; Li, S.; Zheng, C. & Mao, Z. (Ed.), pp. 111-115, Science Press, ISBN: 7-03-018145-
X, Beijing 
Yang, F. & Xiao, D. (2006c). Model and fault inference with the framework of probabilistic 
SDG, Proceedings of 9th International Conference on Control, Automation, Robotics and 
Vision, pp. 1023-1028, ISBN: 1-4244-0341-3, Singapore, December 2006, IEEE, New 
York 
Yang, F. & Xiao, D. (2007). Expressions of logic operators in signed directed graph and its 
applications in complex systems. DCDIS Series B, Vol. 14, No. S2, pp. 1260-1264, 
ISSN: 1492-8760 
Yang, F. & Xiao, D. (2008a). SDG-based fault isolation for large-scale complex systems 
solved by rough set theory, Proceedings of 17th IFAC World Congress, pp. 7221-7226, 
ISBN: 978-3-902661-00-5, Seoul, Korea, July 2008 
Yang, F. & Xiao, D. (2008b). Sensor location strategy in large-scale systems for fault detection 
applications. Journal of Computers, Vol. 3, No. 11, November 2008, pp. 51−57, ISSN: 
1796-203X 
Yu, C.C. & Lee, C. (1991). Fault diagnosis based on qualitative/quantitative process 
knowledge. AIChE Journal, Vol. 37, No. 4, April 1991, pp. 617-628, ISSN: 0001-1541 
Zhang, Z.; Wu, C.; Zhang, B.; Xia, T. & Li, A. (2005). SDG multiple fault diagnosis by real-
time inverse inference. Reliability Engineering & System Safety, Vol. 87, No. 2, May 
2005, pp. 173-189, ISSN: 0951-8320 
www.intechopen.com
Fault Detection
Edited by Wei Zhang
ISBN 978-953-307-037-7
Hard cover, 504 pages
Publisher InTech
Published online 01, March, 2010
Published in print edition March, 2010
InTech Europe
University Campus STeP Ri 
Slavka Krautzeka 83/A 
51000 Rijeka, Croatia 
Phone: +385 (51) 770 447 
Fax: +385 (51) 686 166
www.intechopen.com
InTech China
Unit 405, Office Block, Hotel Equatorial Shanghai 
No.65, Yan An Road (West), Shanghai, 200040, China 
Phone: +86-21-62489820 
Fax: +86-21-62489821
In this book, a number of innovative fault diagnosis algorithms in recently years are introduced.  These
methods can detect failures of various types of system effectively, and with a relatively high significance.
How to reference
In order to correctly reference this scholarly work, feel free to copy and paste the following:
Fan Yang, Deyun Xiao and Sirish L. Shah (2010). Qualitative Fault Detection and Hazard Analysis Based on
Signed Directed Graphs for Large-Scale Complex Systems, Fault Detection, Wei Zhang (Ed.), ISBN: 978-953-
307-037-7, InTech, Available from: http://www.intechopen.com/books/fault-detection/qualitative-fault-detection-
and-hazard-analysis-based-on-signed-directed-graphs-for-large-scale-comp
© 2010 The Author(s). Licensee IntechOpen. This chapter is distributed
under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-
ShareAlike-3.0 License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction for
non-commercial purposes, provided the original is properly cited and
derivative works building on this content are distributed under the same
license.
